Population-Centric Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is an art the U.S. is coming close to perfecting. The CT strategy implemented in Iraq was brilliant yet often mistaken for COIN. In an effort to help formulate a stronger strategy for Afghanistan, I will dissect the 2007 U.S. approach for Iraq.

Enemy - The enemy was clearly defined. Meaningless Orwellian terms such as "anti-Iraqi forces" were eventually tossed out. Al Qaeda in Iraq, a terrorist group, became the primary focus.

Doctrine - Population-centric counterinsurgency as the new strategy. The concept of "clear, hold, build" was outlined as to how it would be implemented and how it related specifically to the Iraq scenario.

Allies - Using the sea to attack the fish. Because of the decentralized nature of the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. was able to take advantage by co-opting a large portion of its support and operational structure to fight as allies. While the 2007 surge leadership typically receives credit for this, it was previously developed in 2006 out in Anbar province.

Overview - The initial cause or issue that sparked an insurgency is ultimately replaced with sentiments on the war itself. Furthermore, the fastest way to create an insurgency is through the use of terrorism, but this is a double edged sword. Eventually the Iraqis grew tired of the violence that came with tactically aligning with al Qaeda in Iraq. With the strategic blunder of pre-maturely announcing an Islamic Caliphate, al Qaeda in Iraq's allies drifted away as some became enemies. Insurgents proved to be a far superior U.S. ally as the official Iraq government security forces were both deeply infiltrated with sectarian militias and largely unwilling to fight for a country appearing at the time on the verge of collapse.

Lessons Learned - A three tier approach outside the "partner" government is the most effective. First: population-centric tactics create the environment necessary to co-opt locals that passively or actively support the insurgency. Second: The insurgency has the best intelligence on the terrorists operating in their areas; co-opt them. Third: drones and kill/capture missions can now be executed with success as a tourniquet has been applied to the terrorists regeneration capabilities.

Can this be applied to Afghanistan?

Unfortunately I cannot answer this question as the President of the United States has yet to state his strategy so I can only be speculative. If the President decides to go after the Taliban, a term the U.S. uses for any Afghan violently opposed to the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai and nationalists fighting non-Muslim foreign troops in their homeland, then no these lessons learned from Iraq cannot be applied.

One unstated concept can be transferred. The Afghans will back whomever they perceive as eventually winning. The U.S. has a 34 year legacy of abandonment well known in Central Asia and currently being witnessed in Iraq. That may prove the ultimate obstacle to overcome.