13 Notes on COIN - JP 3-24

After reading JP 3-24 I noted a few doctrinal issues.

1. COIN is not a synonym for nation building. Foreign troops assisting a nation from violent overthrow from within is conducting foreign internal defense. In this role, the U.S. will eventually depart so gaining the trust of the people serves a temporary purpose.
   
   
2. Without a Department of Foreign Internal Defense creating a unified chain of command for political, economic, and security functions, current COIN operations are 20% effective (temporary security improvements) with 80% wishful thinking towards a HN political solution.
   
   
3. A Host Nation's military force does not have to belong to the government. They can be an indigenous force or militia. Convert portions of the local militia to law enforcement in order to aid in the Hold phase.

   "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward."
   - David Galula, the godfather of modern COIN theory

4. Supporting corrupt and dysfunctional governments only erodes U.S. reputation. Population-centric and Government-centric approaches tend to be conflicting. If helping the people conflicts with helping the current government, back the people.
   
   
5. If theater leadership does not trust small unit leaders to grow a beard or dress according to local customs for fear of losing military discipline, failure may be inevitable. Trusting small unit leaders requires demonstrable actions and "decentralizing to the point of being uncomfortable" is not just an FM 3-24 bumper sticker slogan.
   
   
6. Why are there insurgents in your Area of Operations? The answer will be the foundation for how to uproot them.
   
   
7. Operationally collected information is not "intelligence", but rather the most important data you need and must share. Spam everyone in spite of service, rank, or agency with what you just learned.
   
   
8. T.E. Lawrence was an advisor to an insurgency, not a counterinsurgent. Stop quoting him.
   
   
9. Terrorism has two primary strategic intentions: Intimidate a government into a political retreat or provoke a government heavy handed response. Terrorist propaganda capitalizes on either government reaction to solicit popular support for the group's political goals. A successful terror campaign will result in political concessions or an insurgency.
   
   
10. Economics are not the root cause of insurgency; it is quality of life. Stating that economics drives violent behavior implies the impoverished lack a moral compass. When quality of life improves, only ideologues and zealots remain. Public perceptions of an existential threat are critical to the sustainability of an insurgency.
    
    
11. Liberation remains at the heart of insurgency; from an oppressive government, to a foreign occupation, or a combination thereof.
    
    
12. Media is a force multiplier. The bully loses popular support but so does the coward. Co-opt the locally trusted news sources.
    
    
13. Do not label insurgents as you will most likely be incorrect and appear to locals as if you have no idea what is happening. Everyone opposed to the Iraqi government is not al Qaeda in Iraq and everyone opposed to the Karzai government is not Taliban. Use the labels the locals use but be weary of deception for personal gains.