There are already more than 100,000 international troops in Afghanistan working with 200,000 Afghan security forces and police. It adds up to a 12-1 numerical advantage over Taliban rebels, but it hasn't led to anything close to victory.Let's start with the basics.
Now, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan is asking for tens of thousands more troops to stem the escalating insurgency, raising the question of how many more troops it would take to succeed.
First, an insurgency is not conventional warfare. The Taliban do not march into an open field and fight U.S. and NATO tanks since they know they cannot match firepower. Instead they resort to guerrilla tactics. The author would have known this had he visited the Wikipedia page on insurgency.
Something else the author should have googled was the nearly-three year old Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24. Section 1-67 explains exactly why GEN McChrystal requested more troops.
No force level guarantees victory for either side. During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely. A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counter-insurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.Next time AP wants to inject personal opinion into the news, I would recommend they do their homework first. A few google searches can save a writer's credibility.
Posts
