Bigger Impact on al Qaeda: AF-COIN or PAK-COIN?

Seized photos and passports recovered during military operations against Taliban militants are displayed on a table at Sherwangi Tor village in South Waziristan, during a trip organized by the army October 29, 2009. — Reuters

We are nearly a year into the population-centric COIN strategy in Afghanistan. Last month when the Afghanistan strategy debate was essentially occurring in the media, the public learned two interesting opinions from those involved in decision making. The first was from General McChrystal.

"I do not see indications of a large al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan now," McChrystal told reporters at the Dutch Defense Ministry, where he met military officials.

But he warned that Osama bin Laden's network still maintains contact with insurgents and seeks to use areas of Afghanistan they control as bases.

"I do believe that al-Qaida intends to retain those relationships because they believe it is symbiotic ... where the Taliban has success, that provides a sanctuary from which al-Qaida can operate transnationally," he added.

Back in September, President Obama reiterated this sentiment.

The fight in Afghanistan must be narrowed to its original intent of stamping out al-Qaeda and hunting down Osama bin Laden, President Barack Obama said today.

“We’re there because al-Qaeda killed 3,000 Americans and we cannot allow extremists who want to do violence to the United States to be able to operate with impunity,” Obama said this morning on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos.

Again, finalization of an Afghanistan strategy is awaiting the results of a run-off between the U.S.-backed ballot stuffer Hamid Karzai and the U.S.-backed former Northern Alliance leader Abdullah Abdullah. The run-off will determine who will become the mayor of Kabul.



Al Qaeda has been in Pakistan since the now-infamous Tora Bora escape in December of 2001. The Pakistani COIN operations in South Waziristan are finding trails leading to the remaining members of the Hamburg Cell.

In November 2001, Pakistan’s prestigious Herald magazine, in an investigative story, had given a detailed account of how Said Bahaji along with two of his accomplices, had arrived and stayed in Karachi shortly before the dastardly 9/11 attack and how they had managed to slip out of the country, with at least two of them crossing into Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden had his base under the Taliban’s protection.

The detailed report in the magazine said that on arrival at the Karachi airport the three had identified themselves as Abdellah Hosayni, a Belgian citizen of Algerian dissent, Ammar Moula of Morrocan origin but travelling on a French passport, and German national Said Bahaji. In a normal hustle bustle at the airport, no one noticed that all three got into the same taxi. They then headed for a hotel which none of them had mentioned in the disembarkation card submitted with the Pakistani immigration authorities.

Here is some footage of Ramzi bin al Shibh, Marwan al Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, at the wedding of Said Bahaji taken from a History Channel special on the Hamburg Cell.




Getting this close to al Qaeda members tied to 9/11 is something we have not done in Afghanistan for years. If our ultimate strategy is stated as the destruction of the al Qaeda network, then half hearted attempts at nation building in Afghanistan is not the way to go. Operations by, with, and through our Pakistani "partners" has consistently lead to counterterrorism successes, from the captures of Ramzi bin al Shibh to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Here is some footage from the Pakistani frontlines.