Members of Syria-based Iraqi factions attend the Baath Party's first public meeting in Damascus, dedicated to "the national Iraqi resistance." (AFP/Louai Beshara)
It is hard to determine who will make a greater come-from-behind, the Taliban or the Baath Party. Saddam's outlawed cadre has been used as a political straw man by the Shiite-dominated and Iranian-allied democratic Iraqi government since 2009. Recently, the Baath held their first public meeting in Damascus calling for a reunification of the party. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki blamed the Al Qaeda in Iraq bombing campaign in Baghdad on the Baath in Syria, a claim the Baathists denied. Maliki's accusations deteriorated relations with Syria. It will be interesting to see Maliki's reaction to this Baathist convention in Syria as he continues his attempt to steal the parliamentary election.
Saddam's loyalists in Syria blast US
Supporters of Iraq's late dictator Saddam Hussein gathered in Damascus Thursday to denounce the U.S. "occupation" of Iraq and demand that his loyalists unite. About 500 Saddam loyalists, including members of his outlawed Baath Party, vowed to continue their support to what they called "Iraqi national resistance," a term they widely use to describe Iraqi insurgents attacking only U.S. forces.
Iraq's banned Baath holds first public meeting in Syria
Iraq's banned Baath party, booted out of power in the 2003 US-led invasion, held its first public meeting in the Syrian capital on Thursday. "We have launched negotiations to reunite the party," Ghazwan Qubaissi, the number two in a wing led by Mohammed Yunes al-Ahmad, a former governor of Mosul under now executed dictator and Baath chief Saddam Hussein, told AFP.
Although many would like to take credit for the alleged success of the Iraq COIN campaign, a simple Google search reveals some of the earliest advocates for a tribal engagement strategy. The following is an excerpt from an 8 July2003 Brookings Institution article:
How can the coalition and the new Iraqi government best rein in tribal power? There is no alternative to military action in cases of hard-core resistance, such as Fallujah. Yet it should be possible to control most local tribal challenges as the old regime usually did, simply by effective policing and nonviolent displays of force (although the regime also employed extreme violence to put down political opposition). Nevertheless, the most potent vehicle for central government control is the distribution of government services and other benefits. The Iraqi countryside desperately needs new infrastructure, as well as many basic services and goods, such as purified water, treated sewage, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, irrigation systems, and even high-quality seeds. Within a few months the central government in Baghdad, whether it is still largely run by the coalition forces or by Iraqis, should be able to provide all this and more—even to the most remote villages. At that point, tribal shaykhs will have to work with the government or risk being overthrown by their own people.
As we constantly state on this blog, if you understand the culture the strategy writes itself. You can read the full article, "The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System" here.
Anyone believing that a "clear, hold, build" strategy is the key to a new democratic Afghanistan needs to watch this Frontline special on bacha bazi in Afghanistan.
Just for clarification, the ISAF mission is far more realistic than some of the expectations from civilian COINdinistas.
From ISAF's page:
ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.
I have no idea what that actually means but it is ambiguous enough that anything shy of a civil war can be defined as mission success.
Here is the full episode documenting the starting point in the uphill battle for social reform in Afghanistan.
I encourage anyone still holding the belief that modern U.S. COIN doctrine can create a self-sustaining Jeffersonian democracy in Afghanistan to google the term in the title. PBS Frontline will air an episode covering bacha bazi on April 20th. Here is a short clip.
It was a tragic weekend for Iraq. From the COIN/CT perspective, I thought it would be interesting to study the strategic impact of the two most recent events. Most important to notice will be the Baath connection. Explanation at the bottom.
Sunni Arabs who worked with the Americans as Sons of Iraq say they feel particularly vulnerable. "The Awakening people now are the easy targets for everyone," said Qais al-Jubouri, a tribal leader who worked with the U.S. military and the Iraqi military and government to forge reconciliation in his area of southern Baghdad. Jubouri, who won a seat in the next parliament, has been on the run since the issuance of an arrest warrant against him that he deemed politically motivated.
"The government targets us, and al-Qaeda targets us," he said. "The Americans are done with us, and they threw us under the bus. They lured us as friends, one by one."
Most of the 19 male victims were members of Iraqi security forces or of Awakening Councils, groups that now partner with American forces and are employed by the Iraqi government to protect Sunni neighborhoods, but whose members had once been allied with Sunni extremist groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia during fighting against American troops.
Five women were among the 25 killed, all linked to the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, known as the "Sons of Iraq" by the US army, which joined American and Iraqi forces in 2006 and 2007 to fight against Al-Qaeda and its supporters, leading to a dramatic fall in violence across the country.
The victims were all tied up and shot either in the head or in the chest. Seven other civilians discovered handcuffed in the village were freed.
The elections last month polarized the country, with Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Maliki refusing to accept that an alliance led by rival Iyad Allawi, favored by Sunnis, had won more parliamentary seats than his bloc had. Some Iraqi security officers, U.S. military personnel and Western officials are expressing concern that Al Qaeda in Iraq could reestablish itself on Baghdad's rural perimeter and cause havoc before the next government is formed.
The attack Friday appeared to be aimed at intimidating the Sunni population. Residents of Hawr Rajab said the attackers, wearing American-style military uniforms, arrived in the afternoon. They seized an abandoned home, and one of the men, pretending to be an interpreter, told villagers in a mix of English and Arabic that the "American soldiers" were on a mission.
At least 58 people were killed in a three-day period, according to security sources and Iraqi media, including at least 30 people Sunday morning when three car bombs detonated in the capital near Iranian, Egyptian and German embassy buildings; three people in a separate car bombing in the restive northern city of Mosul; and 25 villagers who had been tied up and executed in a shadowy, early morning attack Saturday on a Sunni village on the southern outskirts of Baghdad.
Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, told the AFP news agency that the incident resembled previous attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq, but it was too soon to be certain as investigations were ongoing.
"They bear the same marks of previous attacks, in the timing, the targeting, the simultaneous attacks on different targets in different places to have maximum impact," he said.
Baghdad hit by triple blasts
The Baath Connection
Any potential gains from the recent election are slowly slipping away. One of the Sons of Iraq leaders who entered politics and won a seat in the new Iraqi government is now a fugitive running from the government he fought for against al Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqi government also accused al Qaeda in Iraq and the Baath as being responsible for the embassy bombings. Currently Ali Faisal al Lami is attempting to disqualify members of Ayad Allawi's coalition through de-baathification. The shadow of Saddam's political apparatus casts a dark shadow on Iraq today. It is still too early to definitively state that a civil war will break out. I fear that a few more instances of political exclusion of the Sunnis, terrorist attacks against the government, and indiscriminate government security operations will bring Iraq to the brink yet again.
Due to professional, academic, and personal commitments I will no longer post the Morning Readbook. For those that need an alternative I recommend the Small Wars Journal Roundup.
Below are the search terms and websites I would use to generate the morning readbook.
Search Terms - The country of choice generates the widest selection of photos. The exception would be anything related to CT in the United States. In that case I would search "homeland"
SAMPLE -
"Iraq"
Pictures of premier-elect Iyad Allawi (L) and outgoing premier Nuri al-Malaki are seen on the front page of an Iraqi newspaper in Baghdad on March 27. Maliki, whose bloc came second in Iraq's general election, sharply criticised the UN envoy to Baghdad on Sunday over his inaction on vote fraud allegations. (AFP/Ali al-Saadi)
I would embed the latest news bulletin at end the readbook.
SAMPLE
Also, I would search through any of their recent programs or segments to see if there was one of interest. There are many detailed stories that never make mainstream headlines but are very applicable to the current COIN/CT debates. Below is a perfect example.
Final Notes -
I plan on posting two more segments in the Basics of COIN series. The next one will deal with Chaotic and Complex scenarios.
As far as the current COIN/CT conflict are concerned, I am waiting to see if Maliki will actually step down from power and what the new Iraqi government will look like when it finally forms. Afghanistan is far too early to make a call without guessing.
An excessive amount of high-fiving and backslapping followed the recent election in Iraq. Unfortunately the parliamentary election is a last minute hail mary pass not the closing chapter of a victorious campaign. In a previous post I was asked what the resistance fighters would do after American forces leave. The answer I gave was not my own, but that of the resistance. Here area two videos from 2008 so you can formulate your own opinion. Included is some great commentary from Bing West and Dr. Austin Long.
People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 1
People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 2
Modus ponens is deductive logic. In formula format this would translate to If p, then q. p; therefore q. An example would be:
-If he was late to class, then he must be enrolled in school.
-He was late to class.
-Therefore, he is enrolled in school.
Modern COIN doctrine, also called population-centric COIN, would be the following:
- If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security for popular support.
- The public perceives a threat.
- Therefore providing security will gain you popular support.
Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Primer
There are two logical fallacies in modern COIN doctrine that I will illustrate below.
In order to apply this logic to a COIN environment, we must first establish a premise then fact. The basic COIN premise would be as follows:
Premise -
If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security to achieve popular support.
Determining the facts on the ground is the most difficult part and the current logical fallacy within modern COIN doctrine. The premise does not answer a simple yet critical question; "threat from whom?"
Facts -
Does the public perceive a threat from...
the host nation government?
insurgents?
counterrevolutionaries?
terrorists?
foreign nation proxies?
This is the second logical fallacy in modern COIN doctrine; a foreign force temporarily protecting the population may make the situation worse in the long term.
The "provide security" solution can be counterproductive depending upon the perceptions of the locals. If the threat is perceived to be from the host nation government, you are intimidating a population into subjugation. The nature of the perceived threat must match the nature of the response. When the host nation government is the perceived threat, then the foreign COIN force must become the honest broker facilitating reconciliation between the people and the government.
Furthermore, the provision of security may only be welcome so long as locals perceive a threat remaining. A more pragmatic, logical premise for "clear, hold, build" would be as follows:
- If the public perceives a threat from a common enemy, then offer to provide security.
- The public perceives a threat from a common enemy.
- Therefore offer to provide security.
It is not that our enemies are so good, it is that we tie our own hands. Timelines are one thing, but giving our people four days to crack a killer with kindness is simply ridiculous and dangerous. Were this story not in the press, this revolving door policy would continue until U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Malcolm Nance is becoming my new favorite author. His assessment and strategy for defeating al Qaeda is brilliant. The commentary and overview provided in the Rachel Maddow interview compliment the counter narrative dialogue over at Al Sahwa I encourage everyone to read. The intro to the interview is cheesy and somewhat painful to watch but once you get past the goofy graphics it gets very interesting, very quick.
Yesterday, Tom Ricks highlighted an article from the Washington Post in which a U.S. military official made the 2005 comparisons.
"All we're doing is setting the clock back to 2005," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to offer a stark assessment. "The militias are fully armed, and al-Qaeda in Iraq is trying to move back from the west. These are the conditions now, and we're sitting back looking at PowerPoint slides and whitewashing."
You can read the full article here. Individuals on their fourth or fifth tour are restricted to bases. The U.S. forces leadership is focused on Iraq's election day and U.S. troops leaving the country. It took General Odierno over a month to publicly acknowledge Iranian interference in the upcoming Iraqi elections, something General Petraeus noted to the press within weeks of the de-baathification bans by Ali Faisal al Lami and Ahmed Chalabi. This calls into question which general has the better grasp of conditions on the ground.
In January we made our own comparisons to 2005, but most recently detailed the reasons for our pessimistic outlook. You can read "Explaining the Pessimism on Iraq" here.
"This past fall, an Afghan video journalist negotiated extraordinary access to a part of the country that has quietly reverted back to Taliban control. For close to two weeks, the journalist traveled a region that he found was now largely under control of the Taliban "shadow" government. He also tracked members of an insurgent cell working with members of Al Qaeda on a mission to sabotage a major U.S./NATO supply route. As the new U.S. strategy focuses on the south and eastern parts of the country, this film opens up a window onto a potential new front in the north, and sheds an important light on who's fighting the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and why."
You can check for updates on the Frontline main page here.
The two most recent Frontline specials on the Taliban are embedded below.
The pessimistic outlook for Iraq is founded in several fact-based observations. This outlook can easily change as events unfold. As of today, here is where we stand:
1. Al Qaeda in Iraq - They were not "strategically defeated" as previously claimed. The phrase has little to no meaning. Today, they are a failed revolutionary insurgent movement, but the most lethal terrorist force in Iraq.
We have previously described violence as an indication that control over territory is disputed. We have also stated that the belief in an existential threat is required to incite violence.
Therefore we would have the following formula:
TC + ET = V
or
Territorial control plus existential threat equals violence
Current Momentum
1. Al Qaeda in Iraq will continue to attack the Iraqi government
2. The Iraqi government does not distinguish between a former Baath party member and a current member of al Qaeda in Iraq
Therefore -
The Iraqi government will eventually be forced to conduct a unilateral security operation against al Qaeda in Iraq completely independent from U.S. influence or support.
Projected Outcome
1. Due to the Iraqi government's consistent mixing of the Baath and al Qaeda in Iraq, this pending operation will likely target Sunni Arabs at large.
2. Such an operation will complete the TC + ET = V formula for Sunni Arab civilians under siege.
3. If the Iraqi government does not succeed immediately in crushing the will to fight, a new insurgency is inevitable.
You may have already seen this video, but it is a great parable on trendy social movements and tipping points.
The audio description is what I found most interesting. The main lesson to walk away with is how crucial it was to easily mimic the dance. Were this a difficult dance, the originator would have been nothing more than an observed solo performer. Also the role of the first follower made it acceptable for a few more people to join. Once the first follower's friends join in, the tipping point is then reached at 1:15. From then on, people join in groups and the originator or "leader" is irrelevant as the movement has a life of his own. Only the music ending stops everyone from dancing, not the "leader."
Now take that template and apply it to al Qaeda in Iraq. What sort of impact would killing or capturing the leadership have today? This is precisely why the classic insurgency texts emphasized the need to destroy an insurgency at its onset. Otherwise it becomes an integrated part of a society for at least a generation if not longer. So how do we end the al Qaeda-styled movements? Find the music and turn it off.
The book "The Tipping Point" by Malcolm Gladwell is a great starting point for those interested in mapping the epidemic-like spread of societal trends through social networks.
Previously I posted on David Kilcullen corroborating concepts we have discussed here. After speaking with a few friends, I felt it important to note where I disagree with Kilcullen and other modern COIN theorists.
I still do not understand why we insist on calling resistance against the governments of two democratic revolutions "insurgencies." The Awakening was against al Qaeda in Iraq, not for the Iraqi government. There are areas in Afghanistan where locals reject the Taliban and the Karzai government. Foreign forces surrounding a village and helping locals rebuild wheelbarrows fosters a temporary working relationship, not acceptance of a new national government.
The revolutionary aspects of these two wars are completely overlooked. We are admittedly terrible at information operations and still have yet to stand up any significant political indoctrination programs. The Taliban will settle land disputes and administer "justice" through sharia courts. ISAF will repair irrigation and tell opium farmers to plant wheat. How are these two actions remotely related?
"Body count" is the only one of Kilcullen's recommendations that really bothered me. If this is being used anywhere it demonstrates the inability of the U.S. to institutionalize lessons learned. This metric is mentioned as a criticism in almost every post-Vietnam paper and is just shy of advising against a Westmoreland-styled strategy of attrition against insurgents. This was the first and most important lesson learned from Vietnam. If this has to be told to U.S. forces in Afghanistan today, we are in far greater trouble than we are currently aware.
Existential threats, whether real or perceived, are the primary instigators of insurgent and counterrevolutionary violence. Political grievances can be found everywhere but most do not translate into violent activity. If a people, social network, or class believe they are on the verge of being annihilated, they will defend themselves. In other words, the system of government is irrelevant when there is a widespread belief of violent injustice.
The concept of defending others is a powerful point for indoctrinating new recruits as well as a strong narrative to gain and maintain popular support. This is done on all sides of a conflict as it holds a universal appeal to human nature; defending the weak against aggression. Osama Bin Ladin would consistently portray the U.S. as the aggressors while he was merely defending all the Muslim people.
And that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.
This means the oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did in Iraq in the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known, and it means the throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children - also in Iraq - as Bush Jr did, in order to remove an old agent and replace him with a new puppet to assist in the pilfering of Iraq's oil and other outrages.
So with these images and their like as their background, the events of September 11th came as a reply to those great wrongs, should a man be blamed for defending his sanctuary?
Is defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us.
Osama Bin Ladin - November 2004
Whether the threat is real or imagined is irrelevant. It simply must be believed in order for violence to occur. This is the most crucial information to discover about a local area. Identify the rumors, truth, and spin propagating the belief of an existential threat. Countering this belief is essential to countering insurgents and counterrevolutionaries.
and Dr. 
.
corroborating concepts we have discussed 
' three Kilcullen excerpts can be found 
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