Iraq 2003 Flashback: The Iraqi Tribes

Although many would like to take credit for the alleged success of the Iraq COIN campaign, a simple Google search reveals some of the earliest advocates for a tribal engagement strategy. The following is an excerpt from an 8 July 2003 Brookings Institution article:

How can the coalition and the new Iraqi government best rein in tribal power? There is no alternative to military action in cases of hard-core resistance, such as Fallujah. Yet it should be possible to control most local tribal challenges as the old regime usually did, simply by effective policing and nonviolent displays of force (although the regime also employed extreme violence to put down political opposition). Nevertheless, the most potent vehicle for central government control is the distribution of government services and other benefits. The Iraqi countryside desperately needs new infrastructure, as well as many basic services and goods, such as purified water, treated sewage, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, irrigation systems, and even high-quality seeds. Within a few months the central government in Baghdad, whether it is still largely run by the coalition forces or by Iraqis, should be able to provide all this and more—even to the most remote villages. At that point, tribal shaykhs will have to work with the government or risk being overthrown by their own people.

As we constantly state on this blog, if you understand the culture the strategy writes itself. You can read the full article, "The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System" here.

OIF Flashback 2008: The Awakening

An excessive amount of high-fiving and backslapping followed the recent election in Iraq. Unfortunately the parliamentary election is a last minute hail mary pass not the closing chapter of a victorious campaign. In a previous post I was asked what the resistance fighters would do after American forces leave. The answer I gave was not my own, but that of the resistance. Here area two videos from 2008 so you can formulate your own opinion. Included is some great commentary from Bing West and Dr. Austin Long.



People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 1




People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 2

Major Gant in the Spotlight

Photo courtesy of http://blog.stevenpressfield.com

During the two month Presidential deliberation on whether or not to provide General McChrystal with the troops he requested, an after action report lit up the blogosphere. Steven Pressfield's "One Tribe at a Time" series has been cited numerous times on this blog and others. The centerpiece of the series was an after-action report written by Major Jim Gant. Today, Major Gant and his assessment were featured in the Washington Post.

It was the spring of 2003, and Capt. Jim Gant and his Special Forces team had just fought their way out of an insurgent ambush in Afghanistan's Konar province when they heard there was trouble in the nearby village of Mangwel. There, Gant had a conversation with a tribal chief -- a chance encounter that would redefine his mission in Afghanistan and that, more than six years later, could help salvage the faltering U.S. war effort.

The article continues...

A decorated war veteran and Pashto speaker with multiple tours in Afghanistan, Gant had been assigned by the Army to deploy to Iraq in November. But with senior military and civilian leaders -- including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and Gen. David Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command -- expressing support for Gant's views, he was ordered instead to return to Afghanistan later this year to work on tribal issues.

"Maj. Jim Gant's paper is very impressive -- so impressive, in fact, that I shared it widely," Petraeus said, while McChrystal distributed it to all commanders in Afghanistan. One senior military official went so far as to call Gant "Lawrence of Afghanistan."

For me, this is proof-positive of how important the blogosphere is in current COIN operations. Through "official" channels, it is highly unlikely that any aspects of Major Gant's assessments or experience would have been taken seriously or even read at all. But by releasing his views through Pressfield, public political pressures have forced leaders, decision makers, and their staffs to take his perspective and experiences into consideration. Furthermore, this public release generated the debate and discussion critical to formulating a functional strategy capable of defining and achieving victory.

You can read Major Gant's "One Tribe at a Time" here. His paper is a perfect example how if you understand the culture the strategy writes itself.

Weekend Reading

I am keeping it simple this weekend since I have no intention of "working" on Halloween. Here is what's on tap for this weekend:

RAND: The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency

I've been fascinated with the Phoenix Program since purchasing Mark Moyar's book "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey." What sold me on reading this RAND report was co=author Austin Long's incredibly detailed CT strategy for Afghanistan over at Foreign Policy.

Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement

Say the words "Force Strategic Engagement Cell" in Iraq and you will get some rough looks from grunts and others. The concept is brilliant on paper but the group currently operating may have outlived its usefulness. The U.S. has its hands tied thanks to the security treaty implemented earlier this year. U.S. military members acting like diplomats, holding no authority, and meeting with insurgents just might send the wrong message to the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Maliki nearly blew a gasket earlier this year where according to the NY Times:

Iraq’s government said Thursday that it was demanding explanations from the United States and Turkey about a protocol signed this year between an American official and a representative of a group of Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Istanbul as a precursor to negotiations between the two sides.

The Iraqi government said in a statement that the protocol amounts to “an interference in Iraq’s internal political affairs” and that it was expecting “clear explanations” from American and Turkish officials at the embassies in Baghdad.

Apparently that was not the first time this year U.S. reconciliation efforts stepped on the Iraqi government's toes.

On April 18, American and British officials from a secretive unit called the Force Strategic Engagement Cell flew to Jordan to try to persuade one of Saddam Hussein’s top generals — the commander of the final defense of Baghdad in 2003 — to return home to resume efforts to make peace with the new Iraq.

But the Iraqi commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Majid al-Hamdani, rebuffed them.

After a year of halting talks mediated by the Americans, he said, he concluded that Iraq’s leader, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, simply was not interested in reconciliation.

I am looking forward to the Strategic Studies Institute read since the FSEC model will likely be recreated in Afghanistan; hopefully by those with more than a few months background. Conventional forces have the bad habit of prioritizing filling billets over finding quality personnel. I have deep concerns over conventional forces handling a mission so critical to counterinsurgency. As proven by events noted above from the past several months, the FSEC model has the potential to do more harm than good.

Warfare at the Ph.D Level

"One Tribe at a Time" will eventually become mandatory reading for those following Afghanistan. Over the past several weeks, we have seen excerpts posted on Steven Pressfield's blog. The full paper is now available for download and is easily THE definitive document on tribal engagement.

You can download the PDF here.

Two sources often cited in the paper:

RAND: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

and

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007 by Antonio Giustozzi