Return of the Mahdi Army

Graphic courtesy of globalsecurity.org


If we look at the bell curve chart of violence in Iraq, we notice that the steep rise began when the Mahdi Army initiated a genocidal campaign with the support of Iraqi forces against the Sunnis. This occurred during the goverment formation period in 2006. We also notice the steep drop in violence just after Muqtada al Sadr ordered the Mahdi Army to stand down.

Due to the actions of a "defeated" and "decapitated" Al Qaeda in Iraq, Muqtada al Sadr has called for the return of the Mahdi Army.


Iraqi Cleric Calls on Followers to Defend Against Attacks
An influential Shi'ite cleric in Iraq is urging followers to defend Shi'ite communities after a series of blasts killed at least 69 people throughout Iraq Friday.

The most deadly attacks targeted Shi'ite neighborhoods and mosques in Baghdad's Sadr city, where a movement led by anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is based. 

Sadr released a statement late Friday calling on his followers to form brigades within the police force and army to defend their places of worship, homes and communities.  Sadr said they must not rely on U.S. forces in Iraq to defend themselves.


Anti-U.S. cleric offers Iraq government help after attacks
Anti-U.S. Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr offered to help the Iraqi government maintain security after bomb attacks against Shi'ites killed 56 people in Baghdad in an apparent backlash by Sunni insurgents.

Sadr's offer of the use of his paramilitary Mehdi Army late Friday was made at a sensitive time for Iraq following a March election that produced no clear winner and left a power vacuum for insurgents to exploit.


Iraq govt says Sadr security help not needed
The Iraqi government said on Saturday that an offer by radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to help boost security at strategic sites was unnecessary, in the wake of anti-Shiite attacks in Baghdad.

A Week in Iraq

Al-Qaeda "targets Baghdad homes" 




Former Iraqi prisoners allege abuse 




Multiple bombings kill many in Iraq 

November 20th Morning Readbook

Former Sahwa leader Adel Mashhadani's arrest in Baghdad's Fadel district on March 28, 2009, triggered street a battle between policemen and the Sahwa, or Awakening, anti-Qaeda militia. (Getty Images)

Sunni leader in Iraq sentenced to death
A leader of a Sunni Awakening Council was sentenced to death for kidnapping and murder yesterday, setting off charges that the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi government was trying to weaken the Sunni movement, which is credited with much of the reduction in sectarian violence since 2006. The Sunni leader, Adil al-Mashhadani, who led the Awakening militia in the impoverished Fadhil neighborhood of Baghdad, was arrested in March on charges of terrorism.


Iraq’s Election Law Morass
Iraqis have quickly learned to play hardball politics. That was evident on Wednesday when one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, who is a Sunni, vetoed an important election law at the last minute. He demanded a change that would allocate more parliamentary seats for Iraqi Sunnis living abroad.


Suicide bomber kills 13 in western Afghanistan
A suicide bomber riding a motorcycle killed 13 people, including a police officer, and wounded 30 others Friday in a busy city square in western Afghanistan.


U.S. missile strike kills 8 in Pakistan
Eight Islamist militants were killed in a U.S. missile strike in northwest Pakistan on Friday, officials said, after three policemen were killed in a bomb blast.


Why Pakistan Won't Fight the Afghan Taliban
President Barack Obama is about to announce his new strategy for Afghanistan, but the success of whatever option he chooses will depend heavily on Pakistan acting to stop its territory being used to attack Western forces next door. And that's bad news, because the demands of its own domestic counterinsurgency campaign, doubts about the duration of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and looming political instability in Islamabad have left Pakistan in no hurry to help out.


The latest news from Al Jazeera.

Weekend Reading

I am keeping it simple this weekend since I have no intention of "working" on Halloween. Here is what's on tap for this weekend:

RAND: The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency

I've been fascinated with the Phoenix Program since purchasing Mark Moyar's book "Phoenix and the Birds of Prey." What sold me on reading this RAND report was co=author Austin Long's incredibly detailed CT strategy for Afghanistan over at Foreign Policy.

Iraq: Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement

Say the words "Force Strategic Engagement Cell" in Iraq and you will get some rough looks from grunts and others. The concept is brilliant on paper but the group currently operating may have outlived its usefulness. The U.S. has its hands tied thanks to the security treaty implemented earlier this year. U.S. military members acting like diplomats, holding no authority, and meeting with insurgents just might send the wrong message to the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Maliki nearly blew a gasket earlier this year where according to the NY Times:

Iraq’s government said Thursday that it was demanding explanations from the United States and Turkey about a protocol signed this year between an American official and a representative of a group of Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Istanbul as a precursor to negotiations between the two sides.

The Iraqi government said in a statement that the protocol amounts to “an interference in Iraq’s internal political affairs” and that it was expecting “clear explanations” from American and Turkish officials at the embassies in Baghdad.

Apparently that was not the first time this year U.S. reconciliation efforts stepped on the Iraqi government's toes.

On April 18, American and British officials from a secretive unit called the Force Strategic Engagement Cell flew to Jordan to try to persuade one of Saddam Hussein’s top generals — the commander of the final defense of Baghdad in 2003 — to return home to resume efforts to make peace with the new Iraq.

But the Iraqi commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Majid al-Hamdani, rebuffed them.

After a year of halting talks mediated by the Americans, he said, he concluded that Iraq’s leader, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, simply was not interested in reconciliation.

I am looking forward to the Strategic Studies Institute read since the FSEC model will likely be recreated in Afghanistan; hopefully by those with more than a few months background. Conventional forces have the bad habit of prioritizing filling billets over finding quality personnel. I have deep concerns over conventional forces handling a mission so critical to counterinsurgency. As proven by events noted above from the past several months, the FSEC model has the potential to do more harm than good.

Population-Centric Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is an art the U.S. is coming close to perfecting. The CT strategy implemented in Iraq was brilliant yet often mistaken for COIN. In an effort to help formulate a stronger strategy for Afghanistan, I will dissect the 2007 U.S. approach for Iraq.

Enemy - The enemy was clearly defined. Meaningless Orwellian terms such as "anti-Iraqi forces" were eventually tossed out. Al Qaeda in Iraq, a terrorist group, became the primary focus.

Doctrine - Population-centric counterinsurgency as the new strategy. The concept of "clear, hold, build" was outlined as to how it would be implemented and how it related specifically to the Iraq scenario.

Allies - Using the sea to attack the fish. Because of the decentralized nature of the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. was able to take advantage by co-opting a large portion of its support and operational structure to fight as allies. While the 2007 surge leadership typically receives credit for this, it was previously developed in 2006 out in Anbar province.

Overview - The initial cause or issue that sparked an insurgency is ultimately replaced with sentiments on the war itself. Furthermore, the fastest way to create an insurgency is through the use of terrorism, but this is a double edged sword. Eventually the Iraqis grew tired of the violence that came with tactically aligning with al Qaeda in Iraq. With the strategic blunder of pre-maturely announcing an Islamic Caliphate, al Qaeda in Iraq's allies drifted away as some became enemies. Insurgents proved to be a far superior U.S. ally as the official Iraq government security forces were both deeply infiltrated with sectarian militias and largely unwilling to fight for a country appearing at the time on the verge of collapse.

Lessons Learned - A three tier approach outside the "partner" government is the most effective. First: population-centric tactics create the environment necessary to co-opt locals that passively or actively support the insurgency. Second: The insurgency has the best intelligence on the terrorists operating in their areas; co-opt them. Third: drones and kill/capture missions can now be executed with success as a tourniquet has been applied to the terrorists regeneration capabilities.

Can this be applied to Afghanistan?

Unfortunately I cannot answer this question as the President of the United States has yet to state his strategy so I can only be speculative. If the President decides to go after the Taliban, a term the U.S. uses for any Afghan violently opposed to the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai and nationalists fighting non-Muslim foreign troops in their homeland, then no these lessons learned from Iraq cannot be applied.

One unstated concept can be transferred. The Afghans will back whomever they perceive as eventually winning. The U.S. has a 34 year legacy of abandonment well known in Central Asia and currently being witnessed in Iraq. That may prove the ultimate obstacle to overcome.

What is happening in Anbar Province? Part II

The return of insurgency.

In a previous posting, we highlighted the deteriorating security situation in Anbar province. We have also discussed the sense of abandonment tribal sheiks once allied with the U.S. are expressing.

For this post I would like to highlight one of the lessons from Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula.

Galula discusses terrorism as a shortcut method of establishing a revolutionary environment. He notes the first step being "blind terrorism" as acts simply to bring attention to the cause. The second step he refers to as "selective terrorism" which involves the targeted killings of low-level government officials that interact with the population.

In Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Roger Trinquier best sums up how the terrorist gains popular support.

The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him; he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect him.

Both of these French officers are the godfathers for modern U.S. COIN doctrine. Both also shed light as to what is occurring now in Anbar Province.

We are witnessing an escalation in target selection. We can safely assess that terrorists have created a permissive environment among the population through intimidation and coercion. As this second insurgency begins to crystallize, we will soon find out if the Iraqis are in fact ready and capable of handling security in their country.

What is happening in Anbar Province?

We have been told continuously all is well, but is that the case? Let's take a look at attacks starting from the U.S. pull out of the cities at the end of June. See if you can find the targeting trend. Headlines from icasualties.org.

JULY

07/15/09 Ramadi - Five people were killed and 12 others were injured mostly soldiers from Abu Risha emergency battalion when a suicide car bomb detonated in downtown Ramadi city around 9 a.m.

07/16/09 Anbar - An Iraqi Emergency Force killed a policeman while attempting to detain him in in his home in Garma neighbourhood, 20 km to the north of Fallujah, Thursday morning.

07/17/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted in the house of a police captain killed two children and wounded 11 other members of the same family in the city of Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

07/17/09 FALLUJA - A bomb inside a football ground killed one person and wounded nine others in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

07/20/09 RAMADI - A bomb in a parked car killed two policemen and wounded another when it exploded near a police checkpoint close to Anbar's provincial council building in central Ramadi.

07/21/09 RAMADI - a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant where deputy provincial police chief Mohammed Dulaimi was having lunch. Five people were killed and 17 were wounded.

07/25/09 FALLUJA - A car bomb exploded near the offices of the Iraqi Islamic Party, killing five people and wounding 21 others in Falluja...an Interior Ministry source said. Police said there were two blasts and put the toll at two killed and 25 wounded.

07/27/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted on the car of an Iraqi army captain killed him in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

07/30/09 QAIM - A suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a police station in Qaim, 300 km (185 miles) west of Baghdad, killing four people and wounding seven, police said.

AUGUST

08/02/09 Haditha - Eight people (three men, three children and two women were killed and 20 others were wounded by a parked car bomb in Haditha town northwest of Ramadi city around 10 a.m.

08/05/09 RAMADI - A bomb in a parked car killed a woman and wounded two policemen and a civilian when it struck a police patrol in central Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

08/14/09 Falaht - One civilian was killed when a bomb detonated near a fuel station in Falaht area to the west of Fallujah around 11 a.m.

08/16/09 FALLUJA - Gunmen broke into a house and killed four people then booby trapped the building with bombs, wounding five people who tried to enter it after the shooting, police said.

08/29/09 FALLUJA - A bomb attached to the car of a local politician representing Interior Minister Jawad Bolani's party killed the politician, his son and another person travelling with them in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

SEPTEMBER

09/07/09 RAMADI - A suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a police checkpoint just outside the city of Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, killing nine people and wounding 13, police said.

09/27/09 RAMADI - A suicide car bomber killed three policemen and wounded eight when he detonated himself outside a police station near Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, local police colonel Ahmed Abood said.

09/28/09 ANBAR - A suicide bomber driving a water tanker packed with explosives blew himself up near a police station, killing seven policemen and wounding 10, said Hussein Ali, a police major in the area west of the city of Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad.

OCTOBER

10/01/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted on a car killed one civilian and wounded another in Fallujah, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

10/05/09 FALLUJA - A roadside bomb killed one civilian and wounded 6, including two Iraqi soldiers, when it exploded near an Iraqi army patrol in central Falluja, 50 km (35 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

10/06/09 FALLUJA - A minibus bomb exploded at a market in the western Iraqi town of Amiriya on Tuesday, killing at least nine people and wounding 31, a local official said.

10/09/09 FALLUJA - A bomb attached to a car killed a Sunni imam and two other people in a village outside of Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.

10/11/09 RAMADI - Three car bombs exploded in Ramadi, 70 miles west of Baghdad, killing 19 and injuring 81. Two car bombs exploded in a quick succession.The third attack targeted the main hospital in the city by a suicide attacker driving a car bomb.

So we have the US mission in Anbar Province drawing to a close, assassinations of authority figures on the rise, and this past weekend two attacks against infrastructure. But since the frequency of attacks and number of people killed are not near the 2006 level, Anbar is still a success. Then again, it took a year for the U.S. leadership to finally acknowledge the existence of an insurgency. I think this quote from the Washington Post article on the bridge bombings sums up the current status.

"If insurgents can possess five tons of explosives and use them freely to destroy bridges, then it would be a shame to claim that we have achieved security,"

A quick 10+ minutes on tribal power plays and dynamics in recent Iraq history.

October 12th Morning Readbook

29 dead in Pakistan Swat Valley blast


Overcoming our failed strategy in Afghanistan


Pakistan to talk to U.S. over aid bill


31 killed as Pakistan jets bomb Taliban: official


Clinton says Afghanistan's Karzai needs to change


Afghanistan: UN-backed fraud panel member resigns


Weapons failed US troops during Afghan firefight


Advancing Marines test new Afghan war doctrine


Bombings Outside Iraq Reconciliation Meeting Kill 23


Opposition Grows to Iraqi Election Plan
Lawmakers to Decide on 'Closed List' Ballot for January Poll Showing Candidates' Affiliations, Rather Than Individual Names


French al-Qaeda suspect 'alluded to attacks', magistrate claims
A physicist arrested on suspicion of collaborating with Islamist fighters while working for the world’s largest nuclear research institute reportedly made references to terrorist attacks in emails intercepted by US intelligence services.


Taliban cannot be split from al-Qaeda, Obama warned


Local, foreign terrorists prepare to face army in Waziristan

Understand the Culture and the Strategy Writes Itself

The modern COIN classic...

What Happens to Collaborators Post-Occupation?

History answers this question typically with the same answer; death. Unfortunately, this is what is facing the Sunni Arabs that were once our enemy, but chose to fight along side us against a common foe. Call them members of the Anbar Awakening or the Sons of Iraq, today they are left with fewer options. Political inclusion, exile, or death are the three roads they have as they hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

These are locals that risk life and limb for a foreign power. At the time it appeared the U.S. and Sunni Arabs had similar interests; defeating al Qaeda in Iraq, preventing a Sunni Arab genocide by Shia and Kurdish death squads and the Iraqi government security forces, and finally carving out a place for Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi national government. The U.S. temporarily achieved those goals, but as the in theater commanders like to put it, the situation is still fragile and reversible.

The great tragedy is that those that assisted the U.S. now feel abandoned and in many ways this perception is reality. The U.S. simply wants to leave with the country being somewhat stable. Right now, those that chose to ally with the U.S. are perceived as collaborators with an occupation. Some are in exile while others fear for their lives.

Here are two stories of perceived U.S. abandonment and the aftermath these Iraqis now have to deal with.

In Anbar, U.S.-Allied Tribal Chiefs Feel Deep Sense of Abandonment

U.S. closes door on a onetime Iraq ally

If you don't have time to read...

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 by Thomas Ricks, here he is talking about it.