Anyone believing that a "clear, hold, build" strategy is the key to a new democratic Afghanistan needs to watch this Frontline special on bacha bazi in Afghanistan.
Just for clarification, the ISAF mission is far more realistic than some of the expectations from civilian COINdinistas.
From ISAF's page:
ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.
I have no idea what that actually means but it is ambiguous enough that anything shy of a civil war can be defined as mission success.
Here is the full episode documenting the starting point in the uphill battle for social reform in Afghanistan.
Due to professional, academic, and personal commitments I will no longer post the Morning Readbook. For those that need an alternative I recommend the Small Wars Journal Roundup.
Below are the search terms and websites I would use to generate the morning readbook.
Search Terms - The country of choice generates the widest selection of photos. The exception would be anything related to CT in the United States. In that case I would search "homeland"
SAMPLE -
"Iraq"
Pictures of premier-elect Iyad Allawi (L) and outgoing premier Nuri al-Malaki are seen on the front page of an Iraqi newspaper in Baghdad on March 27. Maliki, whose bloc came second in Iraq's general election, sharply criticised the UN envoy to Baghdad on Sunday over his inaction on vote fraud allegations. (AFP/Ali al-Saadi)
I would embed the latest news bulletin at end the readbook.
SAMPLE
Also, I would search through any of their recent programs or segments to see if there was one of interest. There are many detailed stories that never make mainstream headlines but are very applicable to the current COIN/CT debates. Below is a perfect example.
Final Notes -
I plan on posting two more segments in the Basics of COIN series. The next one will deal with Chaotic and Complex scenarios.
As far as the current COIN/CT conflict are concerned, I am waiting to see if Maliki will actually step down from power and what the new Iraqi government will look like when it finally forms. Afghanistan is far too early to make a call without guessing.
Modus ponens is deductive logic. In formula format this would translate to If p, then q. p; therefore q. An example would be:
-If he was late to class, then he must be enrolled in school.
-He was late to class.
-Therefore, he is enrolled in school.
Modern COIN doctrine, also called population-centric COIN, would be the following:
- If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security for popular support.
- The public perceives a threat.
- Therefore providing security will gain you popular support.
Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Primer
There are two logical fallacies in modern COIN doctrine that I will illustrate below.
In order to apply this logic to a COIN environment, we must first establish a premise then fact. The basic COIN premise would be as follows:
Premise -
If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security to achieve popular support.
Determining the facts on the ground is the most difficult part and the current logical fallacy within modern COIN doctrine. The premise does not answer a simple yet critical question; "threat from whom?"
Facts -
Does the public perceive a threat from...
the host nation government?
insurgents?
counterrevolutionaries?
terrorists?
foreign nation proxies?
This is the second logical fallacy in modern COIN doctrine; a foreign force temporarily protecting the population may make the situation worse in the long term.
The "provide security" solution can be counterproductive depending upon the perceptions of the locals. If the threat is perceived to be from the host nation government, you are intimidating a population into subjugation. The nature of the perceived threat must match the nature of the response. When the host nation government is the perceived threat, then the foreign COIN force must become the honest broker facilitating reconciliation between the people and the government.
Furthermore, the provision of security may only be welcome so long as locals perceive a threat remaining. A more pragmatic, logical premise for "clear, hold, build" would be as follows:
- If the public perceives a threat from a common enemy, then offer to provide security.
- The public perceives a threat from a common enemy.
- Therefore offer to provide security.
Malcolm Nance is becoming my new favorite author. His assessment and strategy for defeating al Qaeda is brilliant. The commentary and overview provided in the Rachel Maddow interview compliment the counter narrative dialogue over at Al Sahwa I encourage everyone to read. The intro to the interview is cheesy and somewhat painful to watch but once you get past the goofy graphics it gets very interesting, very quick.
Previously I posted on David Kilcullen corroborating concepts we have discussed here. After speaking with a few friends, I felt it important to note where I disagree with Kilcullen and other modern COIN theorists.
I still do not understand why we insist on calling resistance against the governments of two democratic revolutions "insurgencies." The Awakening was against al Qaeda in Iraq, not for the Iraqi government. There are areas in Afghanistan where locals reject the Taliban and the Karzai government. Foreign forces surrounding a village and helping locals rebuild wheelbarrows fosters a temporary working relationship, not acceptance of a new national government.
The revolutionary aspects of these two wars are completely overlooked. We are admittedly terrible at information operations and still have yet to stand up any significant political indoctrination programs. The Taliban will settle land disputes and administer "justice" through sharia courts. ISAF will repair irrigation and tell opium farmers to plant wheat. How are these two actions remotely related?
"Body count" is the only one of Kilcullen's recommendations that really bothered me. If this is being used anywhere it demonstrates the inability of the U.S. to institutionalize lessons learned. This metric is mentioned as a criticism in almost every post-Vietnam paper and is just shy of advising against a Westmoreland-styled strategy of attrition against insurgents. This was the first and most important lesson learned from Vietnam. If this has to be told to U.S. forces in Afghanistan today, we are in far greater trouble than we are currently aware.
Existential threats, whether real or perceived, are the primary instigators of insurgent and counterrevolutionary violence. Political grievances can be found everywhere but most do not translate into violent activity. If a people, social network, or class believe they are on the verge of being annihilated, they will defend themselves. In other words, the system of government is irrelevant when there is a widespread belief of violent injustice.
The concept of defending others is a powerful point for indoctrinating new recruits as well as a strong narrative to gain and maintain popular support. This is done on all sides of a conflict as it holds a universal appeal to human nature; defending the weak against aggression. Osama Bin Ladin would consistently portray the U.S. as the aggressors while he was merely defending all the Muslim people.
And that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.
This means the oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did in Iraq in the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known, and it means the throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children - also in Iraq - as Bush Jr did, in order to remove an old agent and replace him with a new puppet to assist in the pilfering of Iraq's oil and other outrages.
So with these images and their like as their background, the events of September 11th came as a reply to those great wrongs, should a man be blamed for defending his sanctuary?
Is defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us.
Osama Bin Ladin - November 2004
Whether the threat is real or imagined is irrelevant. It simply must be believed in order for violence to occur. This is the most crucial information to discover about a local area. Identify the rumors, truth, and spin propagating the belief of an existential threat. Countering this belief is essential to countering insurgents and counterrevolutionaries.
Last week we posted our sixth installment of the Basics of COIN series dealing with violence as a metric. We noted that violence is an indication of disputed territory, not an indication of stability. Yesterday, David Kilcullen was highlighted on Tom Ricks' blog discussing what not to measure in a COIN environment.
"SIGACTs, especially those involving violence against the coalition." This is a related point. Be wary of SIGACTs trends. Violence may be low in an area simply because it is in the uncontested control of the enemy.
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center has an 11 part series that is definitely worth skimming. The PowerPoints are accompanied by recorded lecture segments for each individual slide. The lectures are broken up as follows:
1) HTS COIN Intro
2) COIN 101 Part 1
3) COIN 101 Part 2
4) Foundations of Insurgency
5) Understanding The Environment
6) Clear Hold Build
7) Culture and Situational Awareness
8) COIN Do's and Don'ts Part 1
9) COIN Do's and Don'ts Part 2
10) COIN Lessons Learned
11) COIN Resources
12) Audio Clips
There is a constant mentioning of "death by PowerPoint" repeated in nearly every lecture which get irritating. Other than that, it is an outstanding resource for what the U.S. military currently believes will solve the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I could not find mention of actual COIN missions conducted by units specially trained in counterinsurgency. Probably the best example is Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines. The Big Army needs to get over its complex of trying to be just like Special Forces. Placing cooks into Jump School and stealing the beret are one thing, but claiming ownership over a mission as delicate as COIN is a potential recipe for disaster. Somewhere along the line the COIN lessons from Vietnam were lost.
Afghan men attend a meeting, or shura, where local tribal elders convene with U.S. Marines on base Delaram in Nimroz province, southern Afghanistan January 9, 2010. REUTERS/Marko Djurica
Violence is easily one of the worst indicators for determining COIN success or failure. Levels of violence will rise when host nation or foreign forces conduct security operations and will fall once those missions are complete. Conversely, insurgent-initiated violence will rise when they are taking over territory and will fall once that area is under their control. In other words, violence is an indicator of disputed territory, not an indicator of stability.
Areas that experienced a spike in violence that later subsided without either a host nation or foreign forces security operation or some sort of local political accommodation with the host nation government are likely under insurgent control. This is true for classic styled insurgencies and counterrevolutionaries. The primary difference between the two is that an insurgency will stand up an alternative government structure whereas counterrevolutionaries seek the expulsion of the new host nation government. This commonality gives us a practical means to measure COIN success.
BernardFall, arguably the greatest COIN theorist and practitioner of the 20th century, used a similar method during the Vietnam conflict. By plotting areas where village chiefs were murdered AND the government of Vietnam was not collecting taxes, Fall identified areas under Vietcong control. The methodology employed was explained in his paper, The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.
When I returned to Viet-Nam in 1957, after the Indochina War had been over for two years, everybody was telling me that the situation was fine. However, I noticed in the South Vietnamese press obituaries of village chiefs, and I was bothered. I thought there were just too many obituaries--about one a day--allegedly killed not by communists, but by "unknown elements," and by "bandits." I decided to plot out a year's worth of dead village officials. The result was that I counted about 452 dead village chiefs to my knowledge at that time. Then I also saw in the press, and here and there in Viet-Nam heard, discussions about "bandit attacks." These attacks were not made at random, but in certain areas. That too worried me, so I decided to plot the attacks. I immediately noted in both cases a very strange pattern. The attacks on the village chiefs were "clustered" in certain areas.
I went to see the Vietnamese Minister of the Interior, Nguyen Huu Chau, who then was, incidentally, the brother-in-law of Madame Nhu [Diem's sister-in-law], and I said to him: "Your Excellency, there is something I'm worried about. You know that I was in the North when the French were losing and I noticed the village chiefs disappearing and I think you now have the same problem here." He said, "What do you mean?" So I just showed him the map. He said, "Well, since you found that out all by yourself, let me show you my map." And he pulled out a map which showed not only the village chiefs but also the communist cells operating in South Viet-Nam in 1957-58, when Viet-Nam was at peace and there was supposedly nothing going on. It was wonderful. We all congratulated each other. Yet, very obviously, to use a somewhat unscientific term, the whole Mekong Delta was going "to hell in a basket," and much of South Viet-Nam with it.1
The insurgency cross-check was unexpectedly provided to me by the International Control Commission. They get reports from the communists as well as from our side, but in this case what interested me was the alleged incidents inside South Viet-Nam. The communists would report from Hanoi, through the ICC, that Americans or Vietnamese were doing certain things out in the villages which Hanoi alleged were "violations" of the ceasefire agreement. I said to myself, "If I plot out all the communist reports about alleged violations on a map, and if they match high-incident areas, there may be a logical connection between the guerrilla operators and the intelligence operators who provide the basis for the ICC reports." Sure enough the same areas with the high incidents also had high reports. As of early 1958, I knew we were in deep trouble in Viet-Nam and I kept saying so.
In 1959 the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization gave me a research grant to do a study on communist infiltration in the area. . . . One of the results of the study: Saigon was deliberately encircled and cut off from the hinterland with a "wall" of dead village chiefs. President Kennedy, in his second State of the Union message on May 25, 1961, stated that during the past year (meaning April 1960-61) the communists killed 4,000 minor officials in Viet-Nam! This was one year before the [Maxwell] Taylor Report which got the whole American major effort going. In other words, in 1960 and 1961 the communists killed 11 village officials a day. By the time we woke up and learned that we had a problem, the communists had killed about 10,000 village chiefs in a country that has about 16,000 villages. This, gentlemen, is "control"--not the military illusion of it.
From then on, it was open and shut. One year later, in 1963, somebody discovered that my system of judging insurgent control from tax returns was applicable to South Viet-Nam also. . . . [The U.S. Agency for International Development, or AID, produced figures that] reflected the situation for March- May 1963, six months before Diem was overthrown, and four months before the Buddhist outbreaks. To make a long story short, in 27 provinces the communists . . . were formally collecting taxes with bonds, receipts, and tax declarations. In [ten more areas] they were collecting taxes on an informal basis. There were only three provinces out of forty-five which reported no communist tax collections!
In closing, determining if an area is under insurgent control is best accomplished by identifying territory where there is no host nation presence and any attempts for the host nation government to establish itself are met with violence and subversion.
The final phase of a revolution consists of guerrillas transitioning to conventional forces and political operatives becoming government officials. Determining whether you are combating an insurgency or supporting a revolution is absolutely critical to formulating a successful strategy. FM 3-24 describes the difficulty in defining an insurgency.
1-2. Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.
This second-to-last sentence is decisive in determining the best course of action. If you are facilitating the final phase of a revolution, there will be aspects of the conflict that will not fit an insurgency template as you are instead facing counterrevolutionary warfare.
The less popular the government, the more ad hoc support for militants: Traditional revolutionary warfare consists of winning popular support, forming shadow governments, and eventually create liberated areas. Revolutionary governments brought to power by foreign forces have never made this connection with the population. Opposition to this revolutionary government will be a social movement of like-minded individuals and social networks, not a coordinated insurrection seeking to overthrow the newly constituted government.
Capitalism absent of the rule of law defines corruption: People crying out for justice do not want modernization. The quality of life should remain the same or rise. This is not to be confused with the standard of living, a common capitalist bias measuring income. In democratic revolutions supported by the United States, bags of money are typically exchanged for the passage of laws in line with Western philosophies on economics, governance, and human rights. In spite of this fact, American leaders are still shocked when they discover corruption in their new partner governments. "Clear-hold-build" will only serve to pay off locals temporarily willing to cooperate. A more accurate slogan to execute would be "clear-hold-govern."
Counterrevolutionaries are not insurgents: COIN principles applied to counterrevolutionaries can only bring about temporary improvements in security after fighting militants unwilling or unable to retreat. Counterinsurgency theory requires the isolation of insurgents in order to rejoin the population with the government. What if the government isolates itself from the people?
Measure the presence of government, not a decline in violence: Today dramatic drops in violence are cited as evidence that U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine works yet the political failings remain apparent. If there are no visible or measurable signs of the existence of a national government outside of the capital, that is not a success. Declaring victory by highlighting that violence is now limited to a few buildings destroyed every two months is akin to failing an exam but bragging about not receiving the lowest grade.
Albert Einstein said it best. "Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order--in short, of government." This is the essence of revolutionary warfare and the template for defeating counterrevolutionaries.
A US military personnel talks to a district government representative about 3 kms from the Afghan-Pakistan border in eastern Afghanistan. A top military intelligence chief is calling for revamped US intelligence efforts in Afghanistan in a scathing report that says the current focus on insurgent networks is "only marginally relevant." (AFP/File/Simon Lim)
Pat Ryan over at al Sahwa has an outstanding analysis of the CNAS/ISAF "Fixing Intel" report I highly recommend everyone read. Ryan's article goes right into the weeds of the issue with realistic alternatives for returning intelligence viability back to the tactical level. The full article can be read here.
Comments on open source information along with criticisms of battalion-level S-2 assessments throughout the CNAS/ISAF report reminded me of this recent posting over at Long War Journal's Threat Matrix blog.
The 1/17’s soldiers said their train-up was also marked by an absence of good intelligence on what they would be facing in the Arghandab. In their zeal to give their men some insight into their future area of operations, noncommissioned officers such as Staff Sgt. Matthew T. Sanders, 1st Squad leader in Charlie Company’s 1st Platoon, resorted to printing out information on the Arghandab region from the Long War Journal, a respected non-Defense Department Web site, and posting it on bulletin boards.
“We made our own little S-2 because we weren’t getting anything from the S-2 [intelligence directorate],” Sanders said.
I am sure there are plenty of us in the blogosphere that would be more than willing to compile open source information on behalf of units currently serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. We only need a central meeting place for tasking requests and responses. Would the Pentagon approve of such open source collaboration?
Iraqis gather at the site of a car bomb attack in western Baghdad. (AP Photo/Khalid Mohammed)
Either assessment is pure speculation at this point. The future of the Iraq conflict will be determined in the aftermath of the national elections along with the composition of the new Iraqi government and its internal policies.
No significant reason - I referenced November because that happens to be the month the New York Times used in the year-over-year-over-year comparison in the chart I was commenting on.
I assume that lower November totals have to do with the occurence of the Hajj and Eid al-Adha in that month. This could be a consequence of lower insurgent activity, the Iraqi Army's liberal leave policy, or both.
Aside from the seasonality in absolute monthly totals, November 09 showed a 33.3% decline in ISF deaths, whereas September showed a 36.7% decline, October showed a 27.1% decline, and December showed a 54% decline. The year-over-year trend among all months is fairly consistent, which of course is good news.
This type of statistical measurement of success, while having its obvious flaws is very necessary and a strong starting point.
The listed categories are:
Iraqi Civilian Deaths from War
Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Security Force Deaths
Former Sunni Insurgents Hired by Iraqi Government
US Troops in Iraq
US Troop Deaths
Electricity Production
Telephone Customers
To quote the late Bernard Fall, "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered." David Galula and Mao Zedong both note that a revolutionary war or "people's war" is 80% political and 20% military.
The best metrics would start from prior to the war, not the peak of violence. This will only demonstrate that we are no longer at the worst point. It would also be dominated by motivators for violence, not violent actions. For example, instead of electricity production which is a national metric, measure the consistency of electricity flow by province.
Other metrics I would like to list for comparison of pre-war status to today would be:
Electricity consistency
Sanitation pickup
Water purification / availability
Employment
Postal Service
Tax Collection
If it is a local or national grievance it should be measured. These legitimate grievances are used in insurgent propaganda to build popular support. Measuring these should give us a better read on progress for the overall campaign, not just from the peak of violence. Until then, we cannot claim progress since the start of the war, but rather only state we are currently no longer in its most violent phase.
Unidentified men walk in front of the house of Alhaji Umar Abdul Mutallab, the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Christmas Day terrorist. (AP Photo/ Muhammad Salisu Rabiu)
Every time a Western-educated, middle class fundamentalist participates in a terrorist attack, we are told that an accurate terrorist profile does not exist. This is obviously not the case. For attacks and attack attempts against the United States, there are a few things the suspects have had in common.
Western educated
Middle Class
Devoutly religious/political
International travel
This is obviously not a catch-all, but intelligent security practices would apply this template to suspects. Instead, I expect many of us not fitting this profile to be harassed by TSA for the next few years.
Here is a list of terrorism suspects over the past 4 months that fit the profile above:
Detroit Metropolitan airport police corporal Richard Frederick walks through the airport with 'explosives detection' dog Spence in Romulus, Michigan. REUTERS/Rebecca Cook
U.S. plane attacker passed Nigeria security checks A Nigerian man who tried to blow up a U.S. passenger jet went through normal security checks when he began his journey in Lagos and had a multiple-entry U.S. visa issued in London, a senior Nigerian aviation official said.
Pentagon reviewing strategic information operations Trying to counter information-savvy enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has rapidly spent nearly $1 billion in the past three years on strategic communications.
Iraq steps up Ashoura security Tens of thousands of Iraqi security personnel have been deployed in the holy shrine city of Karbala for the climax of the Shia Muslim Ashoura commemorations.
Elite U.S. Force Expanding Hunt in Afghanistan Secretive branches of the military’s Special Operations forces have increased counterterrorism missions against some of the most lethal groups in Afghanistan and, because of their success, plan an even bigger expansion next year, according to American commanders.
US drone strike 'kills 13' in Pakistan A US missile attack that demolished a compound in Pakistan's tribal belt used by militants crossing into Afghanistan killed 13 fighters, Pakistani security officials said Sunday.
The Center for a New American Security has two new interesting papers out; one on contractors in warzones, the other on redefining the missions of special operations forces. Also, the Strategic Studies Institute published an outstanding monograph on the "YouTube war."
When our nation goes to war, contractors go with it. Contractors have become an enduring feature of modern American conflicts, and the United States cannot now engage in hostilities or in reconstruction and stabilization operations without them. At their peak, there were more contractors on the ground in Iraq than American troops in uniform and there are more contractors today in Afghanistan than there are U.S. troops on the ground.
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have played a key role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in the broader U.S. effort to destroy al Qaeda and its violent extremist allies. In fact, over the past eight years SOF have experienced their most extensive and transformative use of the modern era. Still, these strategic national assets are not yet fully optimized for success.
Here is the Strategic Studies Institute Monograph:
Terrorist attacks today are often media events in a second sense: information and communication technologies have developed to such a point that these groups can film, edit, and upload their own attacks within minutes of staging them, whether the Western media are present or not. In this radically new information environment, the enemy no longer depends on traditional media. This is the “YouTube War.” This monograph methodically lays out the nature of this new environment in terms of its implications for a war against media-savvy insurgents, and then considers possible courses of action for the Army and the U.S. military as they seek to respond to an enemy that has proven enormously adaptive to this new environment and the new type of warfare it enables.
Villagers shout anti-American and anti-Afghan government slogans during a funeral for people killed in a pre-dawn NATO operation, in Mehtar Lam, Afghanistan, some 100 kilometers (60 miles) east of Kabul, Tuesday, Dec. 8, 2009. The Afghan government said NATO forces killed six civilians during a pre-dawn operation Tuesday in eastern Afghanistan. NATO disputed the allegation saying only militants died. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul)
ADMIN NOTE:
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan remain unique since they both emerged from U.S. attempts to create a Western-styled government in the wake of military-driven regime changes. Ultimately, the U.S. created two "failed/failing" states and is now conducting the "peacekeeping" missions of the 90s. The only difference between today and the 90s is that military and elected U.S. leadership is now willing to take casualties. No significant strategy change has occurred.
Overview
The missions that the U.S. military are most comfortable with are typically counterproductive in COIN operations. Below is a short narrative to illustrate the point.
What would be your reaction if a Predator drone fired a missile into your neighbor's living room while you were sleeping? How long would you complain about it and to whom would you complain? What would be your opinion of your government if the answer you received was "there is nothing we can do?"
The satisfaction of having a violent neighbor meet his demise is overshadowed by the unnerving thought that the missile nearly hit your home. You do not trust the foreign pilot's sources of targeting information to always be accurate because you do not know the pilot. Although you support the removal of terrorists from your neighborhood, you now feel there is an existential threat against your life from foreign forces your government cannot control. You have mentally taken the first step in becoming an insurgent.
The next night, foreign troops raid your other neighbor's home. This neighbor you know to be innocent because he is friendly and helpful to everyone in the neighborhood, even the bad influences. It was his way of keeping the peace in his backyard. You see him and his family dragged away with black bags over their heads as you remember every time you were seen conversing with the recently-deceased terrorist neighbor. The innocent neighbor that was just taken away has always complained over your fence being on his property. Will he take this opportunity in detention to lie about you?
Who then do you turn to? You do not trust the government since they are powerless as demonstrated by the missile strike. You have no means of communicating with the foreign military forces. The only option you believe to have is to talk to the insurgency and hopefully receive their protection. In exchange for re-settling your family to a new location, they ask that you fight in a guerrilla band for a year. With no other options, you accept and are now a wanted fugitive.
What lessons can we take away from this narrative?
1. Strikes that kill an enemy will alienate the population if they do not feel some level of involvement. Local involvement in target selection must be mandatory. Commanders aware of the polarizing effects of air strikes become timid over ordering attacks. This leads to higher "blue force" casualties. Is the life of one of your countrymen worth the life of a foreigner? Most people will answer no, but current DoD policy forces a "yes" decision. In other words, the concept that Iraqi and Afghan lives are more valuable than American lives has been institutionalized by current policy.
2. Capturing raids have an isolating effect same as missile strikes. For whatever reason, the U.S. is far more comfortable conducting these missions in lieu of air strikes. These missions marginalize the power and authority of the local leaders, government officials, and security forces.
3. Logic may identify links between people, but human nature places them into context. The friendly neighbor was often seen with a known terrorist. But knowing the fact that the friendly neighbor was a "social butterfly" would have likely cancelled the raid mission. Instead a publicly known innocent man and his family were traumatized and dragged out of their homes by a foreign force. Respected locals involved in target acquisition would have prevented this raid from ever occurring.
Conclusion
Military actions absent a significant and relevant local partnership will erode any trust in the national government. Local empowerment remains key for foreign forces conducting stabilization missions in a COIN campaign on behalf of a foreign government. Failure to bring existing local power players into the planning process will alienate a population from its national government forcing the populace to seek out alternative power structures. Indigenous local support is far more important than host nation government support.
Tom Ricks has a must-read today over at Foreign Policy. Conventional forces are simply not qualified to conduct the COIN operations asked of them. While senior DoD officials and cheerleading generals say otherwise, they must do exactly that to preserve the chain of command.
From the Marine Gunnery Sergeant that wrote to Ricks:
Doesn't matter if you like the people or not. Don't really care if you think their ideology is bullshit. Fact is if you want to win, the people have to believe that you are sincere and convincing them that it is in their best interest to support you vice your enemy is a key part. Winning is what matters and the only way to do that is getting better at COIN and IO, regardless of how much we hate it.
It is unrealistic to think that the average soldier/marine is going to have the cultural sensitivity to deal with the local population they way that COIN doctrine requires. Better to have specialists on-board who are dressed differently from the the rest of the troop, who might speak the local language (although Americans are notoriously dim when it comes to this skill), and whose MO it is to make friends and gather intelligence. Isn't that what the CIA is supposed to be doing?
If you are a regular reader of this blog or others you will note that most of the local and regional criticism of the US and NATO COIN strategy is centered around the lack of Muslim involvement. How does NATO get around this without requesting a mass conversion of all civilians and military members in Afghanistan to Islam?
Operations Conducted under Fatwas
The Imams of the Grand Mosque in Mecca must support the mission. Request a fatwa from the Imams justifying NATO presence for the pacification of Afghanistan. In addition, if they could mention some words about government corruption, that would be fantastic.
NATO Sharia Courts
Battle space owners should be less concerned with the grooming standards of other units operating in their area of operations. Instead they should have their local Islamic scholars hand out death sentences for local Taliban to culturally justify the NATO kill / capture missions. If they are uncomfortable handing out such edicts, ask for rulings to forbid Taliban protection.
One of the main objectives of population-centric COIN is to push the population off the fence having them choose sides. Fighting against pashtunwali and Islam is a near-impossible venture. Instead use it to your advantage and try not to radically change the indigenous culture.
The title is nothing more than a fancy rewording of counterinsurgency. Fabious Maximus has a great series of posts that delves into the social science foundation of the U.S. COIN Manual. Specifically he discusses how the foundations of modern COIN theory lie in largely unquestioned assumptions pulled from the social sciences. You can read his article here.
The phrase used on this blog, "understand the culture and the strategy writes itself" is an attempt to simplify effective COIN principles for the practitioner. Overseas population-centric COIN will always be done as a foreign force surrounding an area while patrols openly solicit the native citizens for information on the "bad" guys. An honest sociological approach would state such an action for what it truly is; intimidation of the populace.
If a foreign military surrounds your neighborhood, announced they would be leaving shortly to be replaced by a native security force, and only want to rid your neighborhood of fundamentalist guerrillas, would you cooperate? Does your cooperation mean you desire to radically change your own way of life to mimic that of the foreign military's culture?
Great segment from Dr. John Nagl, one of the more influential COINdinistas from the Center for a New American Security. Also if you have never read "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife," it is a great book comparing the COIN campaigns in Malaya and Vietnam.
corroborating concepts we have discussed 
' three Kilcullen excerpts can be found 
, "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered." 
and 
both note that a revolutionary war or "people's war" is 80% political and 20% military.
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