corroborating concepts we have discussed here. After speaking with a few friends, I felt it important to note where I disagree with Kilcullen and other modern COIN theorists.I still do not understand why we insist on calling resistance against the governments of two democratic revolutions "insurgencies." The Awakening was against al Qaeda in Iraq, not for the Iraqi government. There are areas in Afghanistan where locals reject the Taliban and the Karzai government. Foreign forces surrounding a village and helping locals rebuild wheelbarrows fosters a temporary working relationship, not acceptance of a new national government.
The revolutionary aspects of these two wars are completely overlooked. We are admittedly terrible at information operations and still have yet to stand up any significant political indoctrination programs. The Taliban will settle land disputes and administer "justice" through sharia courts. ISAF will repair irrigation and tell opium farmers to plant wheat. How are these two actions remotely related?
"Body count" is the only one of Kilcullen's recommendations that really bothered me. If this is being used anywhere it demonstrates the inability of the U.S. to institutionalize lessons learned. This metric is mentioned as a criticism in almost every post-Vietnam paper and is just shy of advising against a Westmoreland-styled strategy of attrition against insurgents. This was the first and most important lesson learned from Vietnam. If this has to be told to U.S. forces in Afghanistan today, we are in far greater trouble than we are currently aware.
Tom Ricks
' three Kilcullen excerpts can be found here, here, and here.
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