Basics of COIN Part 8: Modus Ponens

Modus ponens is deductive logic. In formula format this would translate to If p, then q. p; therefore q. An example would be:

-If he was late to class, then he must be enrolled in school.
-He was late to class.
-Therefore, he is enrolled in school.

Modern COIN doctrine, also called population-centric COIN, would be the following:

- If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security for popular support.
- The public perceives a threat.
- Therefore providing security will gain you popular support.


Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Primer




There are two logical fallacies in modern COIN doctrine that I will illustrate below.


In order to apply this logic to a COIN environment, we must first establish a premise then fact. The basic COIN premise would be as follows:

Premise -

If the public perceives a threat, then you must provide security to achieve popular support.

Determining the facts on the ground is the most difficult part and the current logical fallacy within modern COIN doctrine. The premise does not answer a simple yet critical question; "threat from whom?"

Facts - 

Does the public perceive a threat from...

the host nation government?
insurgents?
counterrevolutionaries?
terrorists?
foreign nation proxies?

This is the second logical fallacy in modern COIN doctrine; a foreign force temporarily protecting the population may make the situation worse in the long term.

The "provide security" solution can be counterproductive depending upon the perceptions of the locals. If the threat is perceived to be from the host nation government, you are intimidating a population into subjugation. The nature of the perceived threat must match the nature of the response. When the host nation government is the perceived threat, then the foreign COIN force must become the honest broker facilitating reconciliation between the people and the government.

Furthermore, the provision of security may only be welcome so long as locals perceive a threat remaining. A more pragmatic, logical premise for "clear, hold, build" would be as follows:

- If the public perceives a threat from a common enemy, then offer to provide security.
- The public perceives a threat from a common enemy.
- Therefore offer to provide security.

Follow Up: Vindication Via Kilcullen

Previously I posted on David Kilcullen corroborating concepts we have discussed here. After speaking with a few friends, I felt it important to note where I disagree with Kilcullen and other modern COIN theorists.


I still do not understand why we insist on calling resistance against the governments of two democratic revolutions "insurgencies." The Awakening was against al Qaeda in Iraq, not for the Iraqi government. There are areas in Afghanistan where locals reject the Taliban and the Karzai government. Foreign forces surrounding a village and helping locals rebuild wheelbarrows fosters a temporary working relationship, not acceptance of a new national government.

The revolutionary aspects of these two wars are completely overlooked. We are admittedly terrible at information operations and still have yet to stand up any significant political indoctrination programs. The Taliban will settle land disputes and administer "justice" through sharia courts. ISAF will repair irrigation and tell opium farmers to plant wheat. How are these two actions remotely related?

"Body count" is the only one of Kilcullen's recommendations that really bothered me. If this is being used anywhere it demonstrates the inability of the U.S. to institutionalize lessons learned. This metric is mentioned as a criticism in almost every post-Vietnam paper and is just shy of advising against a Westmoreland-styled strategy of attrition against insurgents. This was the first and most important lesson learned from Vietnam. If this has to be told to U.S. forces in Afghanistan today, we are in far greater trouble than we are currently aware.


Tom Ricks' three Kilcullen excerpts can be found here, here, and here.

Basics of COIN Part 7: Threat

(AFP/File/Str)


Existential threats, whether real or perceived, are the primary instigators of insurgent and counterrevolutionary violence. Political grievances can be found everywhere but most do not translate into violent activity. If a people, social network, or class believe they are on the verge of being annihilated, they will defend themselves. In other words, the system of government is irrelevant when there is a widespread belief of violent injustice.

The concept of defending others is a powerful point for indoctrinating new recruits as well as a strong narrative to gain and maintain popular support. This is done on all sides of a conflict as it holds a universal appeal to human nature; defending the weak against aggression. Osama Bin Ladin would consistently portray the U.S. as the aggressors while he was merely defending all the Muslim people.

And that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.

This means the oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did in Iraq in the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known, and it means the throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children - also in Iraq - as Bush Jr did, in order to remove an old agent and replace him with a new puppet to assist in the pilfering of Iraq's oil and other outrages.

So with these images and their like as their background, the events of September 11th came as a reply to those great wrongs, should a man be blamed for defending his sanctuary?

Is defending oneself and punishing the aggressor in kind, objectionable terrorism? If it is such, then it is unavoidable for us.

Osama Bin Ladin - November 2004

Whether the threat is real or imagined is irrelevant. It simply must be believed in order for violence to occur. This is the most crucial information to discover about a local area. Identify the rumors, truth, and spin propagating the belief of an existential threat. Countering this belief is essential to countering insurgents and counterrevolutionaries.

A word of caution. If a foreign force or host nation government is determined to violently neutralize a group of people, negating the perceptions of an existential threat may ultimately facilitate an attempt at genocide similar to what we witnessed in Iraq after the parliamentary elections and government formation in 2006. When people have no option but to fight or die, they will do exactly that.

Vindication Via Kilcullen

Last week we posted our sixth installment of the Basics of COIN series dealing with violence as a metric. We noted that violence is an indication of disputed territory, not an indication of stability.  Yesterday, David Kilcullen was highlighted on Tom Ricks' blog discussing what not to measure in a COIN environment.

"SIGACTs, especially those involving violence against the coalition." This is a related point. Be wary of SIGACTs trends. Violence may be low in an area simply because it is in the uncontested control of the enemy.

You can read Ricks' full entry here.

Basics of COIN Part 6: Violence

 

Afghan men attend a meeting, or shura, where local tribal elders convene with U.S. Marines on base Delaram in Nimroz province, southern Afghanistan January 9, 2010. REUTERS/Marko Djurica

Violence is easily one of the worst indicators for determining COIN success or failure. Levels of violence will rise when host nation or foreign forces conduct security operations and will fall once those missions are complete. Conversely, insurgent-initiated violence will rise when they are taking over territory and will fall once that area is under their control. In other words, violence is an indicator of disputed territory, not an indicator of stability.

Areas that experienced a spike in violence that later subsided without either a host nation or foreign forces security operation or some sort of local political accommodation with the host nation government are likely under insurgent control. This is true for classic styled insurgencies and counterrevolutionaries. The primary difference between the two is that an insurgency will stand up an alternative government structure whereas counterrevolutionaries seek the expulsion of the new host nation government. This commonality gives us a practical means to measure COIN success.

Bernard Fall, arguably the greatest COIN theorist and practitioner of the 20th century, used a similar method during the Vietnam conflict. By plotting areas where village chiefs were murdered AND the government of Vietnam was not collecting taxes, Fall identified areas under Vietcong control. The methodology employed was explained in his paper, The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

When I returned to Viet-Nam in 1957, after the Indochina War had been over for two years, everybody was telling me that the situation was fine. However, I noticed in the South Vietnamese press obituaries of village chiefs, and I was bothered. I thought there were just too many obituaries--about one a day--allegedly killed not by communists, but by "unknown elements," and by "bandits." I decided to plot out a year's worth of dead village officials. The result was that I counted about 452 dead village chiefs to my knowledge at that time. Then I also saw in the press, and here and there in Viet-Nam heard, discussions about "bandit attacks." These attacks were not made at random, but in certain areas. That too worried me, so I decided to plot the attacks. I immediately noted in both cases a very strange pattern. The attacks on the village chiefs were "clustered" in certain areas.

I went to see the Vietnamese Minister of the Interior, Nguyen Huu Chau, who then was, incidentally, the brother-in-law of Madame Nhu [Diem's sister-in-law], and I said to him: "Your Excellency, there is something I'm worried about. You know that I was in the North when the French were losing and I noticed the village chiefs disappearing and I think you now have the same problem here." He said, "What do you mean?" So I just showed him the map. He said, "Well, since you found that out all by yourself, let me show you my map." And he pulled out a map which showed not only the village chiefs but also the communist cells operating in South Viet-Nam in 1957-58, when Viet-Nam was at peace and there was supposedly nothing going on. It was wonderful. We all congratulated each other. Yet, very obviously, to use a somewhat unscientific term, the whole Mekong Delta was going "to hell in a basket," and much of South Viet-Nam with it.1

The insurgency cross-check was unexpectedly provided to me by the International Control Commission. They get reports from the communists as well as from our side, but in this case what interested me was the alleged incidents inside South Viet-Nam. The communists would report from Hanoi, through the ICC, that Americans or Vietnamese were doing certain things out in the villages which Hanoi alleged were "violations" of the ceasefire agreement. I said to myself, "If I plot out all the communist reports about alleged violations on a map, and if they match high-incident areas, there may be a logical connection between the guerrilla operators and the intelligence operators who provide the basis for the ICC reports." Sure enough the same areas with the high incidents also had high reports. As of early 1958, I knew we were in deep trouble in Viet-Nam and I kept saying so.

In 1959 the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization gave me a research grant to do a study on communist infiltration in the area. . . . One of the results of the study: Saigon was deliberately encircled and cut off from the hinterland with a "wall" of dead village chiefs. President Kennedy, in his second State of the Union message on May 25, 1961, stated that during the past year (meaning April 1960-61) the communists killed 4,000 minor officials in Viet-Nam! This was one year before the [Maxwell] Taylor Report which got the whole American major effort going. In other words, in 1960 and 1961 the communists killed 11 village officials a day. By the time we woke up and learned that we had a problem, the communists had killed about 10,000 village chiefs in a country that has about 16,000 villages. This, gentlemen, is "control"--not the military illusion of it.

From then on, it was open and shut. One year later, in 1963, somebody discovered that my system of judging insurgent control from tax returns was applicable to South Viet-Nam also. . . . [The U.S. Agency for International Development, or AID, produced figures that] reflected the situation for March- May 1963, six months before Diem was overthrown, and four months before the Buddhist outbreaks. To make a long story short, in 27 provinces the communists . . . were formally collecting taxes with bonds, receipts, and tax declarations. In [ten more areas] they were collecting taxes on an informal basis. There were only three provinces out of forty-five which reported no communist tax collections!

In closing, determining if an area is under insurgent control is best accomplished by identifying territory where there is no host nation presence and any attempts for the host nation government to establish itself are met with violence and subversion.

Basics of COIN Part 5: Revolutions

 REUTERS/Mohamad Torokman


The final phase of a revolution consists of guerrillas transitioning to conventional forces and political operatives becoming government officials. Determining whether you are combating an insurgency or supporting a revolution is absolutely critical to formulating a successful strategy. FM 3-24 describes the difficulty in defining an insurgency.

1-2. Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.

This second-to-last sentence is decisive in determining the best course of action. If you are facilitating the final phase of a revolution, there will be aspects of the conflict that will not fit an insurgency template as you are instead facing counterrevolutionary warfare.


The less popular the government, the more ad hoc support for militants: Traditional revolutionary warfare consists of winning popular support, forming shadow governments, and eventually create liberated areas. Revolutionary governments brought to power by foreign forces have never made this connection with the population. Opposition to this revolutionary government will be a social movement of like-minded individuals and social networks, not a coordinated insurrection seeking to overthrow the newly constituted government.

Capitalism absent of the rule of law defines corruption: People crying out for justice do not want modernization. The quality of life should remain the same or rise. This is not to be confused with the standard of living, a common capitalist bias measuring income. In democratic revolutions supported by the United States, bags of money are typically exchanged for the passage of laws in line with Western philosophies on economics, governance, and human rights. In spite of this fact, American leaders are still shocked when they discover corruption in their new partner governments. "Clear-hold-build" will only serve to pay off locals temporarily willing to cooperate. A more accurate slogan to execute would be "clear-hold-govern."

Counterrevolutionaries are not insurgents: COIN principles applied to counterrevolutionaries can only bring about temporary improvements in security after fighting militants unwilling or unable to retreat. Counterinsurgency theory requires the isolation of insurgents in order to rejoin the population with the government. What if the government isolates itself from the people?

Measure the presence of government, not a decline in violence: Today dramatic drops in violence are cited as evidence that U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine works yet the political failings remain apparent. If there are no visible or measurable signs of the existence of a national government outside of the capital, that is not a success. Declaring victory by highlighting that violence is now limited to a few buildings destroyed every two months is akin to failing an exam but bragging about not receiving the lowest grade.

Albert Einstein said it best. "Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order--in short, of government." This is the essence of revolutionary warfare and the template for defeating counterrevolutionaries.

Major Gant in the Spotlight

Photo courtesy of http://blog.stevenpressfield.com

During the two month Presidential deliberation on whether or not to provide General McChrystal with the troops he requested, an after action report lit up the blogosphere. Steven Pressfield's "One Tribe at a Time" series has been cited numerous times on this blog and others. The centerpiece of the series was an after-action report written by Major Jim Gant. Today, Major Gant and his assessment were featured in the Washington Post.

It was the spring of 2003, and Capt. Jim Gant and his Special Forces team had just fought their way out of an insurgent ambush in Afghanistan's Konar province when they heard there was trouble in the nearby village of Mangwel. There, Gant had a conversation with a tribal chief -- a chance encounter that would redefine his mission in Afghanistan and that, more than six years later, could help salvage the faltering U.S. war effort.

The article continues...

A decorated war veteran and Pashto speaker with multiple tours in Afghanistan, Gant had been assigned by the Army to deploy to Iraq in November. But with senior military and civilian leaders -- including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and Gen. David Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command -- expressing support for Gant's views, he was ordered instead to return to Afghanistan later this year to work on tribal issues.

"Maj. Jim Gant's paper is very impressive -- so impressive, in fact, that I shared it widely," Petraeus said, while McChrystal distributed it to all commanders in Afghanistan. One senior military official went so far as to call Gant "Lawrence of Afghanistan."

For me, this is proof-positive of how important the blogosphere is in current COIN operations. Through "official" channels, it is highly unlikely that any aspects of Major Gant's assessments or experience would have been taken seriously or even read at all. But by releasing his views through Pressfield, public political pressures have forced leaders, decision makers, and their staffs to take his perspective and experiences into consideration. Furthermore, this public release generated the debate and discussion critical to formulating a functional strategy capable of defining and achieving victory.

You can read Major Gant's "One Tribe at a Time" here. His paper is a perfect example how if you understand the culture the strategy writes itself.

The Challenge COIN Reading List - Intro to Insurrection

War of the Flea - Written before the peak of the Vietnam War, this book profiles multiple revolutions across the globe. A must-read for understanding the basics of insurrection.












Partisan Warfare - The lost lessons of World War II are subtly told within this book. While the conventional warfare aspects of the European conflict are portrayed in movies and novels ad nauseum, little mention is given to the fact that the Allies were supporting every Nazi resistance movement in Europe.


The Tipping Point - Understanding the basics of how a trend starts is essential to comprehending the epidemic-like spread of insurgent sympathy and support among the population.












Brave New War - Globalization and modernization have dramatically changed the face of modern warfare and revolution. This is the template to view any types of proliferation social networks, whether narcotic, ideological, or ad hoc munitions.










Inside the Jihad - Understand the culture and the strategy writes itself. This is probably one of the best insights into the clandestine nature of self-radicalized mujahidin living in Western societies and connected to oveseas terrorist/guerrilla movements.

Basics of COIN Part 4: Military Limitations

REUTERS/Bruno Domingos

Foreign conventional military forces cannot provide a self-sustaining economic, educational, medical, or political solution to another nation's insurgency. At most, foreign militaries can temporarily assist in security and provide a logistics chain for other efforts. The idea that a political problem can be completely solved with a military solution is false unless the intent is to create a military dictatorship.

Cultural Aspects

Most cultures with ongoing insurgencies involving the U.S. hold great respect for elders, yet the first face these influential locals meet are a young non-native speaking member of the military. The universal nature of warrior cultures will go only so far in assisting relations. Granted an all-volunteer military affords the opportunity for the best and brightest to end up on the front lines, but this is personality dependent not institutionalized. Does the U.S. military have its most qualified COIN troops leading operations in Afghanistan today? The answer is reflective of the national priority for achieving success.

Origins of Oil Spot

Another danger with military-centric approaches to COIN is the repetition of failed or inapplicable strategy; specifically the oil spot or ink blot. Bernard Fall best sums up the origins of this strategy.

Some people have spoken of what is called the "oil-slick principle," which has been described as the holding of one particular area, one central area, and working one's way out of the center. That was fine when the French developed the concept for the Sahara, because in the Sahara there are obligatory watering points. If they have all the oases, those outside have to come in and get water. But Viet-Nam doesn't happen to be the Sahara or an oasis. Thus, the oil-slick method succeeds mostly in pushing the Viet Cong units into the next province. Of course, it looks good, at least, because for one week there will be a "cleared" province. For the time being this is considered adequate until something more imaginative is discovered.

In a chaotic environment we have what are called attractors. Think of dropping a bag of marbles on your kitchen floor. It would be nearly impossible to accurately predict how each marble would bounce, roll, and settle. But drop a bag of marbles into a large funnel and you could accurately predict where they would end up. Identifying these cultural attractors is critical to formulating a successful COIN strategy. In other words where are the most people, specifically insurgents funneled? The answer contrary to U.S. strategy is not always a city as demonstrated by Fall's oasis example. Sometimes it is a location, an event or time frame.

Dependable Host Nation Partner

Current U.S. COIN doctrine focuses on providing security for the population in order to join the people with their government. But what if the government is an enemy of the population it governs? Or worse, what if the government does not exist in an area? A recent RAND commentary from earlier this summer discusses this issue.

A key tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine is to empower the host government to fight the forces trying to topple it. But in Iraq the government itself was for years little more than a microcosm of the complex mix of conflicts in the country. Attempts to strengthen the government embroiled the United States in a nettlesome political balancing act. The Americans were frequently in the awkward position of picking winners and losers, and often manipulated by one faction to gain advantage over its rivals. The very state forces the United States helped to establish and train were implicated on numerous occasions in systematic sectarian violence.

As a third-party military conducting COIN operations, U.S. forces will be manipulated, used, and befriended by opportunists. This is not always a bad thing, but it will reshuffle the local power. In this situation the counterinsurgents are the revolutionaries seeking to change the status quo. Absent a reliable partner and political indoctrination of local partners, any achievements by the counterinsurgents will be temporary. Upon exiting the nation, they will leave with their money, influence, logistics, and protection for local collaborators.

Counterinsurgents as Revolutionaries

Political indoctrination is at the core of revolutions yet the U.S. military has not institutionalized this at the grassroots level. Although the military may not be the best suited to carry out such a mission, but they are capable of facilitating those trained in indoctrinating the masses. Insurgencies end with political solutions. If the U.S. desires to leave behind a stable and democratic government in Iraq and Afghanistan, political indoctrination is required. The U.S. is asking people to give up their way of life, one that has barely changed for centuries. The ultimate goal then becomes convincing an ancient people into desiring a modern society. Without indoctrinating a population into a culturally acceptable means of adopting such a quantum leap of lifestyle, mission failure can be delayed but ultimately inevitable.

David Kilcullen speaks to this specific point:

Politically, in many cases today, the counterinsurgent represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counterinsurgency. Pakistan’s campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qa’ida (AQ) linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against 21st century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernization, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counterinsurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalization.

Demands for modernization without values, politics, ethics, morals, or any sort of culturally translatable narrative gives the insurgents the propaganda opportunity necessary for them to leverage nationalist sentiments. This brings into question the larger debate; is modernization and nation-building necessary to counter an insurgency?

Basics of COIN Part 3: Anarchy and Insurgency

(AP Photo/Mukhtar Khan)

Countering an insurgency is not building a nation

A nation must first exist in order for an insurgency to exist as well. Merriam-Webster defines "anarchy" as:

1a : absence of government
b : a state of lawlessness or political disorder due to the absence of governmental authority
c : a utopian society of individuals who enjoy complete freedom without government

Does this best describe your COIN situation? If so, you are not countering an insurrection, you are countering the creation of government. In other words, YOU are the insurgency. Keep in mind that insurgents are not limited to violence alone as they are trying to establish an alternative form of governance.

Now if you have the mission of fighting against the "bad" insurgents while assisting locals to become part of the national government you support, then welcome to neo-colonialism (aka nation-building).

Is neo-colonialism too strong a word?

Possibly. But ask yourself if the U.S. and NATO would support a democratically elected Taliban government. The fact is that we want a "democratically" elected government that will act in the best interests of NATO and the United States.

You can support that. So what is wrong with nation-building?

The U.S. is terrible at it; instead it unintentionally creates breeding grounds for instability and radicalism. There are certain levels of literacy, education, economics, essential services, and most importantly security that are required for both stability and democracy. Keep those five metrics in mind when reading this list of the most corrupt governments in the world courtesy of Transparency International:

1. Somalia
2. Afghanistan
3. Myanmar
4. Sudan
5. Iraq
6. Chad
7. Uzbekistan
8. Turkmenistan
9. Iran
10. Haiti

Note that most of the listed countries were and still are failed U.S. experiments in nation-building. Democratic elections have brought international legitimacy to HAMAS and Hezbollah among other former insurgent groups. Keep in mind that democracy is a popularity contest and insurgents require popular support.

Before I begin, I say to you that security is an indispensable pillar of human life and that free men do not forfeit their security, contrary to Bush's claim that we hate freedom...No, we fight because we are free men who don't sleep under oppression. We want to restore freedom to our nation, just as you lay waste to our nation.

-Osama bin Laden, October 2004

An insurgent must appear as a modern day Robin Hood in order to maintain popular support. Building a nation does not counter an insurgency, it creates an easy target to popularly oppose, to justifiably attack, and to eventually replace; all while damaging the international reputation of those responsible for its creation.

Basics of COIN Part 2: The Insurgency

REUTERS/Stringer


An insurgency is the manifestation of popular will, not exclusively guerrilla and terrorist actions. There can be numerous reasons why and how an insurgency begins, but once it has endured over a period of time the popular "cause" becomes irrelevant. Eventually a fence-sitting population will side with the projected winner of the conflict as backing a losing side is a potential death sentence. Survival is the most basic instinct and most important factor during an insurrection.

The political nature of an insurgency is tragically often overlooked. Western militaries go to great lengths to separate politics from military action but this is a doctrine for failure. War is an extension of politics and insurgency is a form of armed politics. While the Defense Department excludes itself from politics, U.S. diplomats in Kabul and Baghdad interact with host nation government officials as if they are representatives from a well-established European nation, not opportunistic collaborators. Failure to respond to the political nature of an insurgency is a "whole of government" U.S. failure.


Strategies for disrupting insurgent violence:

Hammer and Anvil:

Kill / Capture missions carried out within a controlled environment. Conventional troops will secure the population while other units conduct raiding operations to dismantle the known insurgent network. Kill / Capture missions alone may remove known members but ultimately prove futile if insurgents can still recruit.

Amnesty:

There have been few successful counterinsurgency campaigns absent an amnesty program. Without a means to surrender, host nation governments force insurgents to fight to the death. Insurgencies can be marginalized and isolated from the population, but absolute destruction is only possible in a dictatorial police state. Former insurgents entering into a "witness protection" styled program can be used in propaganda to crush the morale of active insurgents while providing critical information on insurgents at large.

Network Corruption:

Insurgent groups are structured dynamic social networks of cells based upon previous or recent trusted relationships. When the trust of a cell erodes, the network begins to collapse. Arrest five insurgents, ask four to spy on the insurgency, and release all of them. The four solicited insurgents will suspect the fifth one is a traitor and possibly have him killed. Paranoia will grow if this process is repeated continuously.


These efforts conducted simultaneously will maximize chances for success in mitigating violence, but will only provide a window of opportunity for the host nation government to settle legitimate political grievances that spawned the insurgency. Removing the "cause" from the insurgency is required to isolate and marginalize the remaining insurgents from the population in order to achieve a true victory.

Basics of COIN Part 1

(AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo)

You can have links to every blog out there, an entire library from Galula to Kilcullen, and still make things worse than when you arrived. In the simplest of terms, counterinsurgency is a popularity contest. Repeatedly on this blog it is stated that if you understand the culture the strategy will write itself. This is exactly what this refers to as you have been thrown into a popularity contest. Garrison military customs and courtesies will destroy your unit's ability to innovate; take the necessary steps to politically outmaneuver the enemy on his home turf.

General Overview:

If you have no chance of the population electing you to an office, relieve yourself of command. You are a foreigner and most likely not a muslim. There is little you can relate to at the offset, so if you burn bridges within your first three months you created an insurgent friendly environment.

Rank is an antiquated concept and counterproductive in COIN. You may have cultural experts in your unit but overlooked them. Ditch the rank and formalities until you are out of the country. Network your experts and trusted minds keeping them outside a traditional chain of command.

Break every World War II-era regulation designed to maintain discipline. Beards, first names, and modified uniforms specifically are half your battle. Imagine you are on a plane and five men dressed just like Mullah Omar sit in first class. What is going through your head? It is the same thing that is going through an Afghans when he sees yet another foreign military unit in his home country.

Find a native Afghan salesman while still in your home country and have him teach you everything he knows. It is one thing to be able to sell something to your neighbor, it is another to talk a Taliban supporter into following you. Understanding the culture will assist in formulating an effective approach for your unique area of operations.

Do not back corrupt officials; their tainted credibility damages yours as well. Do whatever you have to in order for them to resign. When they resign, take credit for it to keep your place as an honest broker in the eyes of the population.

Avoid internal strife. Mission envy destroys morale just as fast as taking casualties. Do not come down on a unit that is required to do more or dress differently. You are all on the same team and need them as much as you need the population on your side.

Neutrality in reporting current events is a myth; specifically during an insurgency. The media and rumors will always help one side and hurt another. Negative news carries more weight than positive. Also a "good news" story from an untrusted source (your PAO) has the same effect as a vicious rumor. Free speech is a luxury; do not defend your critics as they are intentionally or unwittingly shaping opinion against you.

Your popularity is your life. Do whatever you have must to keep it as high as possible; among your troops, partner agencies, and most importantly the population you will now protect. The public will typically fall into three of five basic categories in the spectrum of opinion: hate, dislike, indifference, like, love. Keep them ranging from indifference, like, and love and you will be fine.

Focus on the influential, not the masses. In other words, win the shepherds as they bring the sheep. Your resources and capabilities will be nowhere close to what you need. A focused campaign of winning over elders, chiefs, and mullahs will get you where you need to be much faster as time is another luxury you will not have.

Train your local replacement. Find an individual out of the population to take your place. He must be as popular as yourself if not more so. Most importantly, he must be able to tap into the resources you have available. Not creating a self-sustaining environment is simply kicking the can down the road. This is the first step in grassroots acceptance of governance.