If we look at the bell curve chart of violence in Iraq, we notice that the steep rise began when the Mahdi Army initiated a genocidal campaign with the support of Iraqi forces against the Sunnis. This occurred during the goverment formation period in 2006. We also notice the steep drop in violence just after Muqtada al Sadr ordered the Mahdi Army to stand down.
Due to the actions of a "defeated" and "decapitated" Al Qaeda in Iraq, Muqtada al Sadr has called for the return of the Mahdi Army.
The most deadly attacks targeted Shi'ite neighborhoods and mosques in Baghdad's Sadr city, where a movement led by anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is based.
Sadr released a statement late Friday calling on his followers to form brigades within the police force and army to defend their places of worship, homes and communities. Sadr said they must not rely on U.S. forces in Iraq to defend themselves.
Anti-U.S. cleric offers Iraq government help after attacks
Anti-U.S. Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr offered to help the Iraqi government maintain security after bomb attacks against Shi'ites killed 56 people in Baghdad in an apparent backlash by Sunni insurgents.
Sadr's offer of the use of his paramilitary Mehdi Army late Friday was made at a sensitive time for Iraq following a March election that produced no clear winner and left a power vacuum for insurgents to exploit.
Iraq govt says Sadr security help not needed
The Iraqi government said on Saturday that an offer by radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to help boost security at strategic sites was unnecessary, in the wake of anti-Shiite attacks in Baghdad.
A paper displays photographs of a man the Iraqi government claims to be al-Qaida leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi at a news conference in Baghdad, Iraq, Monday, April 19, 2010. (Xinhua/AFP Photo)
Two top leaders of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq are killed in raid
The two top leaders of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq were slain in a U.S. airstrike over the weekend, a decisive tactical victory for American and Iraqi forces and one that provides Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with additional political leverage at a crucial time.
Iraq announces killing of another senior al-Qaida leader
Iraq announced Tuesday the killing of another senior leader of al-Qaida group in the country, an official television reported. "Iraqi security forces killed the terrorist Ahmed al-Obaidi, also known as Abu Suhaib, the military leader for Qaida terrorist organization in the provinces of Nineveh, Kirkuk and Salahudin," the state-run television of Iraqia, quoted Mohammed al-Askari media advisor of the Iraqi Defence Ministry as saying.
Secret prison revealed in Baghdad
Hundreds of Sunni men disappeared for months into a secret Baghdad prison under the jurisdiction of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's military office, where many were routinely tortured until the country's Human Rights Ministry gained access to the facility, Iraqi officials say.
Iraq judicial panel orders recount
An Iraqi judicial panel on Monday ordered a manual recount of about 2.5 million ballots cast in Baghdad in last month's national elections, an action requested by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's alliance, which had filed allegations of vote fraud.
For whatever reason there is a debate over whether or not the Surge succeeded. Zen Pundit has probably the best coverage while Abu Muqawama is the one that picked the fight with the blogosphere. I will let Tom Ricks start this one off.
Now let expand on one of the very important points he brings up in the beginning. The new strategy for Iraq was announce by then-President Bush. Before the US press started calling it "the surge" it was known as "The New Way Forward in Iraq."
The President's New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:
1. Let the Iraqis lead; 2. Help Iraqis protect the population; 3. Isolate extremists; 4. Create space for political progress; 5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and 6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.
Number 4 is the specific one mentioned by Ricks. But the "New Way Forward" is not the only officially stated means to measure success.
1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.
2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification.
3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.
5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.
8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.
9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
11. Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.
12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said “the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”
13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.
14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces’ units capable of operating independently.
16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.
18. Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.
Now that we have the official "metrics" from the then-President and the official means of measuring success that was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, the debate can continue.
My personal assessment is that the war is still going on. We simply cannot say whether it was a success yet. If there is any question to answer it would be this one.
Have any troops been authorized weekend leave in Baghdad? Saigon was safe enough for R&R.
It was a tragic weekend for Iraq. From the COIN/CT perspective, I thought it would be interesting to study the strategic impact of the two most recent events. Most important to notice will be the Baath connection. Explanation at the bottom.
Sunni Arabs who worked with the Americans as Sons of Iraq say they feel particularly vulnerable. "The Awakening people now are the easy targets for everyone," said Qais al-Jubouri, a tribal leader who worked with the U.S. military and the Iraqi military and government to forge reconciliation in his area of southern Baghdad. Jubouri, who won a seat in the next parliament, has been on the run since the issuance of an arrest warrant against him that he deemed politically motivated.
"The government targets us, and al-Qaeda targets us," he said. "The Americans are done with us, and they threw us under the bus. They lured us as friends, one by one."
Most of the 19 male victims were members of Iraqi security forces or of Awakening Councils, groups that now partner with American forces and are employed by the Iraqi government to protect Sunni neighborhoods, but whose members had once been allied with Sunni extremist groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia during fighting against American troops.
Five women were among the 25 killed, all linked to the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, known as the "Sons of Iraq" by the US army, which joined American and Iraqi forces in 2006 and 2007 to fight against Al-Qaeda and its supporters, leading to a dramatic fall in violence across the country.
The victims were all tied up and shot either in the head or in the chest. Seven other civilians discovered handcuffed in the village were freed.
The elections last month polarized the country, with Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Maliki refusing to accept that an alliance led by rival Iyad Allawi, favored by Sunnis, had won more parliamentary seats than his bloc had. Some Iraqi security officers, U.S. military personnel and Western officials are expressing concern that Al Qaeda in Iraq could reestablish itself on Baghdad's rural perimeter and cause havoc before the next government is formed.
The attack Friday appeared to be aimed at intimidating the Sunni population. Residents of Hawr Rajab said the attackers, wearing American-style military uniforms, arrived in the afternoon. They seized an abandoned home, and one of the men, pretending to be an interpreter, told villagers in a mix of English and Arabic that the "American soldiers" were on a mission.
At least 58 people were killed in a three-day period, according to security sources and Iraqi media, including at least 30 people Sunday morning when three car bombs detonated in the capital near Iranian, Egyptian and German embassy buildings; three people in a separate car bombing in the restive northern city of Mosul; and 25 villagers who had been tied up and executed in a shadowy, early morning attack Saturday on a Sunni village on the southern outskirts of Baghdad.
Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, told the AFP news agency that the incident resembled previous attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq, but it was too soon to be certain as investigations were ongoing.
"They bear the same marks of previous attacks, in the timing, the targeting, the simultaneous attacks on different targets in different places to have maximum impact," he said.
Baghdad hit by triple blasts
The Baath Connection
Any potential gains from the recent election are slowly slipping away. One of the Sons of Iraq leaders who entered politics and won a seat in the new Iraqi government is now a fugitive running from the government he fought for against al Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraqi government also accused al Qaeda in Iraq and the Baath as being responsible for the embassy bombings. Currently Ali Faisal al Lami is attempting to disqualify members of Ayad Allawi's coalition through de-baathification. The shadow of Saddam's political apparatus casts a dark shadow on Iraq today. It is still too early to definitively state that a civil war will break out. I fear that a few more instances of political exclusion of the Sunnis, terrorist attacks against the government, and indiscriminate government security operations will bring Iraq to the brink yet again.
An excessive amount of high-fiving and backslapping followed the recent election in Iraq. Unfortunately the parliamentary election is a last minute hail mary pass not the closing chapter of a victorious campaign. In a previous post I was asked what the resistance fighters would do after American forces leave. The answer I gave was not my own, but that of the resistance. Here area two videos from 2008 so you can formulate your own opinion. Included is some great commentary from Bing West and Dr. Austin Long.
People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 1
People & Power - Saddam's tribal strategy - 28 Oct 08 - Pt 2
Former Sahwa leader Adel Mashhadani's arrest in Baghdad's Fadel district on March 28, 2009, triggered street a battle between policemen and the Sahwa, or Awakening, anti-Qaeda militia. (Getty Images)
Sunni leader in Iraq sentenced to death A leader of a Sunni Awakening Council was sentenced to death for kidnapping and murder yesterday, setting off charges that the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi government was trying to weaken the Sunni movement, which is credited with much of the reduction in sectarian violence since 2006. The Sunni leader, Adil al-Mashhadani, who led the Awakening militia in the impoverished Fadhil neighborhood of Baghdad, was arrested in March on charges of terrorism.
Iraq’s Election Law Morass Iraqis have quickly learned to play hardball politics. That was evident on Wednesday when one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, who is a Sunni, vetoed an important election law at the last minute. He demanded a change that would allocate more parliamentary seats for Iraqi Sunnis living abroad.
Suicide bomber kills 13 in western Afghanistan A suicide bomber riding a motorcycle killed 13 people, including a police officer, and wounded 30 others Friday in a busy city square in western Afghanistan.
U.S. missile strike kills 8 in Pakistan Eight Islamist militants were killed in a U.S. missile strike in northwest Pakistan on Friday, officials said, after three policemen were killed in a bomb blast.
Why Pakistan Won't Fight the Afghan Taliban President Barack Obama is about to announce his new strategy for Afghanistan, but the success of whatever option he chooses will depend heavily on Pakistan acting to stop its territory being used to attack Western forces next door. And that's bad news, because the demands of its own domestic counterinsurgency campaign, doubts about the duration of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and looming political instability in Islamabad have left Pakistan in no hurry to help out.
Sahwa militiamen guard a checkpoint on the outskirts of Baghdad. (AFP/File/Aubrey Belford)
Attacks Threaten Fragile Security Gains in Cradle of Iraq Insurgency Maj. Gen. Tariq al-Youssef caught a fleeting glimpse of the man who wanted him dead. As his armored sport utility vehicle pulled past the battered yellow taxi, General Youssef, the commander of the police in Anbar Province, recalled thinking that the driver looked like so many men in this impoverished territory — another poor peasant trying to eke out a living.
FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 16 KIRKUK - A car bomb exploded in a crowded marketplace, killing six and wounding six others in northern Kirkuk, 250 km (155 miles) north of Baghdad. BAGHDAD - A bomb planted under a car parked near an Iraqi army checkpoint exploded, killing two soldiers and wounding six civilians in Baghdad's Mansour District, police said. MOSUL - A hand grenade exploded, killing one civilian in central Mosul, on Sunday, police said.
13 Sunni men, boys reported slain in Iraq In a massacre that revived memories of Iraq's worst years of sectarian bloodshed, assailants dressed in Iraqi army uniforms savagely killed 13 men and boys late Sunday near the restive city of Abu Ghraib, according to Iraqi officials and villagers.
Afghanistan: Barack Obama gets ready to make toughest call of presidency President Barack Obama is expected to make a long-awaited announcement on his Afghan war strategy in the next few days in an attempt to bring an end to a prolonged period of uncertainty surrounding US intentions, officials said today.
Taliban blow up girls' school in Pakistan: officials Taliban militants blew up a girls' school in Pakistan's Khyber district on Tuesday, the third such attack in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan so far this month, officials said. An intelligence official in the area said Taliban attacked the government-run school overnight when no one was at the property.
Holder's al Qaeda Incentive Plan When it comes to terrorists, you would think that an al Qaeda operative who targets an American mom sitting in her office or a child on a flight back home is many degrees worse than a Taliban soldier picked up after a firefight with U.S. Army troops.
The shift to a COIN strategy in Iraq, commonly (although incorrectly) referred to as "the surge", has taken its rightful place in military history this year. We have seen amazing books from Tom Ricks and Linda Robinson that gave us greater insight into what we all experienced or witnessed in Iraq from 2006 to 2008. The Institute for the Study of War is coming out with their retelling of events. Here is a preview.
Say the words "Force Strategic Engagement Cell" in Iraq and you will get some rough looks from grunts and others. The concept is brilliant on paper but the group currently operating may have outlived its usefulness. The U.S. has its hands tied thanks to the security treaty implemented earlier this year. U.S. military members acting like diplomats, holding no authority, and meeting with insurgents just might send the wrong message to the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Maliki nearly blew a gasket earlier this year where according to the NY Times:
Iraq’s government said Thursday that it was demanding explanations from the United States and Turkey about a protocol signed this year between an American official and a representative of a group of Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Istanbul as a precursor to negotiations between the two sides.
The Iraqi government said in a statement that the protocol amounts to “an interference in Iraq’s internal political affairs” and that it was expecting “clear explanations” from American and Turkish officials at the embassies in Baghdad.
On April 18, American and British officials from a secretive unit called the Force Strategic Engagement Cell flew to Jordan to try to persuade one of Saddam Hussein’s top generals — the commander of the final defense of Baghdad in 2003 — to return home to resume efforts to make peace with the new Iraq.
But the Iraqi commander, Lt. Gen. Raad Majid al-Hamdani, rebuffed them.
After a year of halting talks mediated by the Americans, he said, he concluded that Iraq’s leader, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, simply was not interested in reconciliation.
I am looking forward to the Strategic Studies Institute read since the FSEC model will likely be recreated in Afghanistan; hopefully by those with more than a few months background. Conventional forces have the bad habit of prioritizing filling billets over finding quality personnel. I have deep concerns over conventional forces handling a mission so critical to counterinsurgency. As proven by events noted above from the past several months, the FSEC model has the potential to do more harm than good.
Counterterrorism is an art the U.S. is coming close to perfecting. The CT strategy implemented in Iraq was brilliant yet often mistaken for COIN. In an effort to help formulate a stronger strategy for Afghanistan, I will dissect the 2007 U.S. approach for Iraq.
Enemy - The enemy was clearly defined. Meaningless Orwellian terms such as "anti-Iraqi forces" were eventually tossed out. Al Qaeda in Iraq, a terrorist group, became the primary focus.
Doctrine - Population-centric counterinsurgency as the new strategy. The concept of "clear, hold, build" was outlined as to how it would be implemented and how it related specifically to the Iraq scenario.
Allies - Using the sea to attack the fish. Because of the decentralized nature of the insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. was able to take advantage by co-opting a large portion of its support and operational structure to fight as allies. While the 2007 surge leadership typically receives credit for this, it was previously developed in 2006 out in Anbar province.
Overview - The initial cause or issue that sparked an insurgency is ultimately replaced with sentiments on the war itself. Furthermore, the fastest way to create an insurgency is through the use of terrorism, but this is a double edged sword. Eventually the Iraqis grew tired of the violence that came with tactically aligning with al Qaeda in Iraq. With the strategic blunder of pre-maturely announcing an Islamic Caliphate, al Qaeda in Iraq's allies drifted away as some became enemies. Insurgents proved to be a far superior U.S. ally as the official Iraq government security forces were both deeply infiltrated with sectarian militias and largely unwilling to fight for a country appearing at the time on the verge of collapse.
Lessons Learned - A three tier approach outside the "partner" government is the most effective. First: population-centric tactics create the environment necessary to co-opt locals that passively or actively support the insurgency. Second: The insurgency has the best intelligence on the terrorists operating in their areas; co-opt them. Third: drones and kill/capture missions can now be executed with success as a tourniquet has been applied to the terrorists regeneration capabilities.
Can this be applied to Afghanistan?
Unfortunately I cannot answer this question as the President of the United States has yet to state his strategy so I can only be speculative. If the President decides to go after the Taliban, a term the U.S. uses for any Afghan violently opposed to the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai and nationalists fighting non-Muslim foreign troops in their homeland, then no these lessons learned from Iraq cannot be applied.
One unstated concept can be transferred. The Afghans will back whomever they perceive as eventually winning. The U.S. has a 34 year legacy of abandonment well known in Central Asia and currently being witnessed in Iraq. That may prove the ultimate obstacle to overcome.
We have been told continuously all is well, but is that the case? Let's take a look at attacks starting from the U.S. pull out of the cities at the end of June. See if you can find the targeting trend. Headlines from icasualties.org.
JULY
07/15/09 Ramadi - Five people were killed and 12 others were injured mostly soldiers from Abu Risha emergency battalion when a suicide car bomb detonated in downtown Ramadi city around 9 a.m.
07/16/09 Anbar - An Iraqi Emergency Force killed a policeman while attempting to detain him in in his home in Garma neighbourhood, 20 km to the north of Fallujah, Thursday morning.
07/17/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted in the house of a police captain killed two children and wounded 11 other members of the same family in the city of Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
07/17/09 FALLUJA - A bomb inside a football ground killed one person and wounded nine others in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
07/20/09 RAMADI - A bomb in a parked car killed two policemen and wounded another when it exploded near a police checkpoint close to Anbar's provincial council building in central Ramadi.
07/21/09 RAMADI - a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant where deputy provincial police chief Mohammed Dulaimi was having lunch. Five people were killed and 17 were wounded.
07/25/09 FALLUJA - A car bomb exploded near the offices of the Iraqi Islamic Party, killing five people and wounding 21 others in Falluja...an Interior Ministry source said. Police said there were two blasts and put the toll at two killed and 25 wounded.
07/27/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted on the car of an Iraqi army captain killed him in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
07/30/09 QAIM - A suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a police station in Qaim, 300 km (185 miles) west of Baghdad, killing four people and wounding seven, police said.
AUGUST
08/02/09 Haditha - Eight people (three men, three children and two women were killed and 20 others were wounded by a parked car bomb in Haditha town northwest of Ramadi city around 10 a.m.
08/05/09 RAMADI - A bomb in a parked car killed a woman and wounded two policemen and a civilian when it struck a police patrol in central Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
08/14/09 Falaht - One civilian was killed when a bomb detonated near a fuel station in Falaht area to the west of Fallujah around 11 a.m.
08/16/09 FALLUJA - Gunmen broke into a house and killed four people then booby trapped the building with bombs, wounding five people who tried to enter it after the shooting, police said.
08/29/09 FALLUJA - A bomb attached to the car of a local politician representing Interior Minister Jawad Bolani's party killed the politician, his son and another person travelling with them in Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
SEPTEMBER
09/07/09 RAMADI - A suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into a police checkpoint just outside the city of Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, killing nine people and wounding 13, police said.
09/27/09 RAMADI - A suicide car bomber killed three policemen and wounded eight when he detonated himself outside a police station near Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad, local police colonel Ahmed Abood said.
09/28/09 ANBAR - A suicide bomber driving a water tanker packed with explosives blew himself up near a police station, killing seven policemen and wounding 10, said Hussein Ali, a police major in the area west of the city of Ramadi, 100 km (60 miles) west of Baghdad.
OCTOBER
10/01/09 FALLUJA - A bomb planted on a car killed one civilian and wounded another in Fallujah, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
10/05/09 FALLUJA - A roadside bomb killed one civilian and wounded 6, including two Iraqi soldiers, when it exploded near an Iraqi army patrol in central Falluja, 50 km (35 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
10/06/09 FALLUJA - A minibus bomb exploded at a market in the western Iraqi town of Amiriya on Tuesday, killing at least nine people and wounding 31, a local official said.
10/09/09 FALLUJA - A bomb attached to a car killed a Sunni imam and two other people in a village outside of Falluja, 50 km (32 miles) west of Baghdad, police said.
10/11/09 RAMADI - Three car bombs exploded in Ramadi, 70 miles west of Baghdad, killing 19 and injuring 81. Two car bombs exploded in a quick succession.The third attack targeted the main hospital in the city by a suicide attacker driving a car bomb.
So we have the US mission in Anbar Province drawing to a close, assassinations of authority figures on the rise, and this past weekend two attacks against infrastructure. But since the frequency of attacks and number of people killed are not near the 2006 level, Anbar is still a success. Then again, it took a year for the U.S. leadership to finally acknowledge the existence of an insurgency. I think this quote from the Washington Post article on the bridge bombings sums up the current status.
"If insurgents can possess five tons of explosives and use them freely to destroy bridges, then it would be a shame to claim that we have achieved security,"
A quick 10+ minutes on tribal power plays and dynamics in recent Iraq history.
...so long as the Afghans do not look at the U.S. "responsible withdrawal" as a preview of what will happen to U.S. collaborators. I previously blogged about the existential threat to collaborators post-occupation here.
If policy makers do not review recent history from the 1980s or take some time out to watch Charlie Wilson's War, maybe they could keep up with news stories three days apart.
The U.S. is pushing for another aid package for Pakistan. The Pakistan Government is for it, but its citizens and others are not.
A recent poll by the International Republican Institute found that 80 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said they did not want the country to assist the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.
History answers this question typically with the same answer; death. Unfortunately, this is what is facing the Sunni Arabs that were once our enemy, but chose to fight along side us against a common foe. Call them members of the Anbar Awakening or the Sons of Iraq, today they are left with fewer options. Political inclusion, exile, or death are the three roads they have as they hope for the best but prepare for the worst.
These are locals that risk life and limb for a foreign power. At the time it appeared the U.S. and Sunni Arabs had similar interests; defeating al Qaeda in Iraq, preventing a Sunni Arab genocide by Shia and Kurdish death squads and the Iraqi government security forces, and finally carving out a place for Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi national government. The U.S. temporarily achieved those goals, but as the in theater commanders like to put it, the situation is still fragile and reversible.
The great tragedy is that those that assisted the U.S. now feel abandoned and in many ways this perception is reality. The U.S. simply wants to leave with the country being somewhat stable. Right now, those that chose to ally with the U.S. are perceived as collaborators with an occupation. Some are in exile while others fear for their lives.
Here are two stories of perceived U.S. abandonment and the aftermath these Iraqis now have to deal with.
and Dr. 
.
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