Villagers shout anti-American and anti-Afghan government slogans during a funeral for people killed in a pre-dawn NATO operation, in Mehtar Lam, Afghanistan, some 100 kilometers (60 miles) east of Kabul, Tuesday, Dec. 8, 2009. The Afghan government said NATO forces killed six civilians during a pre-dawn operation Tuesday in eastern Afghanistan. NATO disputed the allegation saying only militants died. (AP Photo/Rahmat Gul)ADMIN NOTE:
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan remain unique since they both emerged from U.S. attempts to create a Western-styled government in the wake of military-driven regime changes. Ultimately, the U.S. created two "failed/failing" states and is now conducting the "peacekeeping" missions of the 90s. The only difference between today and the 90s is that military and elected U.S. leadership is now willing to take casualties. No significant strategy change has occurred.
Overview
The missions that the U.S. military are most comfortable with are typically counterproductive in COIN operations. Below is a short narrative to illustrate the point.
What would be your reaction if a Predator drone fired a missile into your neighbor's living room while you were sleeping? How long would you complain about it and to whom would you complain? What would be your opinion of your government if the answer you received was "there is nothing we can do?"
The satisfaction of having a violent neighbor meet his demise is overshadowed by the unnerving thought that the missile nearly hit your home. You do not trust the foreign pilot's sources of targeting information to always be accurate because you do not know the pilot. Although you support the removal of terrorists from your neighborhood, you now feel there is an existential threat against your life from foreign forces your government cannot control. You have mentally taken the first step in becoming an insurgent.
The next night, foreign troops raid your other neighbor's home. This neighbor you know to be innocent because he is friendly and helpful to everyone in the neighborhood, even the bad influences. It was his way of keeping the peace in his backyard. You see him and his family dragged away with black bags over their heads as you remember every time you were seen conversing with the recently-deceased terrorist neighbor. The innocent neighbor that was just taken away has always complained over your fence being on his property. Will he take this opportunity in detention to lie about you?
Who then do you turn to? You do not trust the government since they are powerless as demonstrated by the missile strike. You have no means of communicating with the foreign military forces. The only option you believe to have is to talk to the insurgency and hopefully receive their protection. In exchange for re-settling your family to a new location, they ask that you fight in a guerrilla band for a year. With no other options, you accept and are now a wanted fugitive.
What lessons can we take away from this narrative?
1. Strikes that kill an enemy will alienate the population if they do not feel some level of involvement. Local involvement in target selection must be mandatory. Commanders aware of the polarizing effects of air strikes become timid over ordering attacks. This leads to higher "blue force" casualties. Is the life of one of your countrymen worth the life of a foreigner? Most people will answer no, but current DoD policy forces a "yes" decision. In other words, the concept that Iraqi and Afghan lives are more valuable than American lives has been institutionalized by current policy.
2. Capturing raids have an isolating effect same as missile strikes. For whatever reason, the U.S. is far more comfortable conducting these missions in lieu of air strikes. These missions marginalize the power and authority of the local leaders, government officials, and security forces.
3. Logic may identify links between people, but human nature places them into context. The friendly neighbor was often seen with a known terrorist. But knowing the fact that the friendly neighbor was a "social butterfly" would have likely cancelled the raid mission. Instead a publicly known innocent man and his family were traumatized and dragged out of their homes by a foreign force. Respected locals involved in target acquisition would have prevented this raid from ever occurring.
Conclusion
Military actions absent a significant and relevant local partnership will erode any trust in the national government. Local empowerment remains key for foreign forces conducting stabilization missions in a COIN campaign on behalf of a foreign government. Failure to bring existing local power players into the planning process will alienate a population from its national government forcing the populace to seek out alternative power structures. Indigenous local support is far more important than host nation government support.
Epilogue Based Upon Real Events
We have seen missile strikes and raids flip areas against the national government as they become sympathetic to the insurgency.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JI17Df03.html
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1011930
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/missile-strikes-in-pakistan-will-continue-u/415772/
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/History_of_Iraqi_insurgency
http://www.petermaass.com/articles/the_counterinsurgent/
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33458132/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/
Foreign military detention of innocents and insurgents have radicalized some while turning portions of the public against their national government.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18137725
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes932.html
http://www.grindstonejournal.com/7-29-09terror.html
http://www.meforum.org/2040/is-us-detention-policy-in-iraq-working
A mix of motivators drive one into volunteering for suicide bombings. Revenge appears to be the most common motivation second only to retaining/reclaiming family honor. Thought the motivations for suicide operations may span the spectrum, the instigators remain persistent.
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/what-motivates-suicide-bombers-0
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9327.htm
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Analysis/ANALYSIS_Religion_is_not_the_primary_motivation_of_suicide_bombers_printer.shtml
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18310289
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