October 17th Morning Readbook

Iraqi primary election ordered by Muqtada Sadr draws voters
The anti-American cleric's party holds the country's first primary for candidates in January's nationwide elections. The movement wants to become parliament's largest bloc and thus name the prime mini


Bomber in deadly Iraq mosque attack
More than 12 people have been killed and 42 hurt by a suicide bomber who opened fire inside a Sunni Muslim mosque before detonating his explosives' vest.


Afghanistan awaits vote results
The result of the presidential election in Afghanistan is due to be announced this weekend - two months after the poll marred by fraud allegations.


Pakistan Moves Troops Into Taliban Stronghold
Pakistan moved large contingents of troops into the Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan on Saturday, beginning a long-anticipated ground offensive against Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in treacherous terrain that has overwhelmed the army in the past, the Pakistani Army said.


Beware The Reverse Brain Drain To India And China
This is a guest post by Vivek Wadhwa, an entrepreneur turned academic. He is a Visiting Scholar at UC-Berkeley, Senior Research Associate at Harvard Law School and Executive in Residence at Duke University.

Does Law Enforcement Even Work Against al Qaeda?

In the wake of the Najibullah Zazi arrest and stories that Law Enforcement's role was minimal, I decided to do a quick review of the LE role in CT.

Adam Gadahn is undeniably a member of al Qaeda. But you may or may not get that impression if you look at the FBI's most wanted terrorist list.

Adam Yahiye Gadahn was indicted in the Central District of California for treason and material support to Al Qaeda. The charges are related to Gadahn's alleged involvement in a number of terrorist activities, including providing aid and comfort to Al Qaeda and services for Al Qaeda.

"Alleged involvement" is the really shocking phrase. Not that the war against al Qaeda is a war fought with semantics. But honestly, how many times does he have to promote al Qaeda's agenda on video before the U.S. law enforcement system can state he is in fact a member?

Here are a few videos of his "alleged involvement" with al Qaeda.

October 16th Morning Readbook

Turkey detains 32 al Qaeda suspects in raids-agency
Turkish security forces detained 32 suspected members of the militant group al Qaeda believed to have been planning attacks on NATO, U.S. and Israeli targets, state-run news agency Anatolian reported on Thursday.


India and China in a tit-for-tat spat
New Delhi is objecting to Chinese projects in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir after Beijing protested a visit by India's premier to Arunachal Pradesh state, portions of which China claims.


India's War at Home


Pakistan attacks militant hideouts
Official calls strikes part of a strategy to "soften up targets" before ground offensive


Without fanfare, Obama signs Pakistan aid bill
U.S. President Barack Obama quietly signed a $7.5 billion aid bill for Pakistan on Thursday that drew criticism in the nuclear-armed South Asian country because of conditions linked to the assistance.


Afghan War Debate Endangers U.S. Troops: Veterans
U.S. veterans criticized President Barack Obama's lengthy review of Afghan war strategy, saying on Thursday the drawn-out debate in Washington was a direct threat to troops and the nation's defense.


Our Coming Afghanistan Defeat
he other night I watched “Obama’s War,” a Frontline piece on PBS. It has some real front-line footage in it, including a Marine who’s just been fatally shot, and footage of a verbally pushy Marine trying to talk to Afghan villagers in English. The message to the villagers was: We’re here now, come back to your fields, come back to your markets, let us protect you. The Afghans were skeptical. Wary. Suspicious. The Taliban had threatened that anyone who cooperated with the foreign devils would be killed. The Marine says, in effect, Don’t believe them. Believe us.


Italians bribed the Taleban all over Afghanistan, say officials
A Taleban commander and two senior Afghan officials confirmed yesterday that Italian forces paid protection money to prevent attacks on their troops.

Probably the best CT/COIN Article to Date...

Leave it to Foreign Policy to put out one of the most brilliant assessments of the current situation in Central Asia. Highlights from "All al Qaedas are not created equal" below:

Insurgents and terrorists: not interchangeable

In theoretical terms, a key difference between ‘insurgents' and ‘terrorists' is the focus for each group: for insurgents it's the population, but for terrorists it's self-preservation, namely the ability to train effective operatives while maintaining operational security. Terrorists generally do not have nearly as much influence over a population as do insurgents, nor do they need as much support from it. Unlike an insurgent group that recruits among the population, al Qaeda in AfPak has rarely recruited among Afghans.

Al Qaeda in Iraq vs. al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Despite their shared brand, AQ in AfPak operates very differently from AQI (even in its heyday) and it has very different strategic aims. AQI aimed to control territory in order to discredit the Iraqi government and establish the first blotch in a jihadi oil-spot strategy aimed at redeveloping the caliphate. To achieve this end, AQI built a broad infrastructure that it tried to scale up dramatically, attacked U.S. forces daily, demanded that local insurgents and tribes swear allegiance to a formal State that it declared, provided a detailed -- though ridiculous -- description of the State's responsibilities, named a cabinet (that included positions like a Fisheries Minister), and directly imposed judicial punishments. AQI's aspirations of governance (and, critically, delusions of grandeur) put control over the Iraqi Sunnis at the heart of its strategy, which meant that the group was very vulnerable to a COIN approach designed to separate the group from the population writ large. AQI's strategy was fundamentally dysfunctional because it adopted the goals of an insurgent group without an entrenched social base and despite the fact that non-Iraqis composed its leadership and provided general direction. This mismatch is what Petraeus, McChrystal, McMaster and others so skillfully exploited in Iraq.

Terrorism after COIN

Counterinsurgency achieved what no other strategy could have in Iraq. The Iraqi government is more functional than it was three years ago, and AQI is a shadow of the organization that it was in 2006 and 2007. But even after a COIN strategy was successfully implemented, AQI is still capable of mounting attacks that kill hundreds of people at a time. And because of that, it is worth thinking about the dynamics that have enabled AQI to remain operational in Iraq.

October 15th Morning Readbook

India’s talks offer divides Kashmir separatists


Gunmen, bomber hit 4 sites in Pakistan; 37 die


SCENARIOS: Can things get any worse for Pakistan?


Op-ED: Not Good Enough
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN


U.S. officials look at scenarios for Afghanistan 'middle path'
The strategies under consideration would require fewer additional troops than requested by Gen. McChrystal.


Britain to send 500 more troops to Afghanistan


Taliban commander killed, three arrested in N Afghanistan


FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15


Professors who fled Iraq return to find jobs scarce


UPDATE 1-Lower taxes lure big oil to Iraq oilfield deals


Al Qaeda's Feverish Hunt For Cash



Sources: Zazi Had Contacts With Al-Qaida Leaders

Obama's War

Whatever Happened to...

...Iraq's 18 Benchmarks?

1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.

2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification.

3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.

8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.

10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

11. Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.

12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said ‘‘the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.’’

13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.

15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces’ units capable of operating independently.

16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

18. Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.

India - The Other Side of the Central Asian Iron Triangle

On October 1st, the International Republican Institute released its survey of Pakistan public opinion. Below are some of the more interesting responses.

In your opinion, which of the following countries have good
relations with Pakistan?
Saudi Arabia 87%
USA 2%

Religious extremism is a serious problem in Pakistan.
Disagree 9%
Agree 90%

Do you think that Pakistan should cooperate with the United
States on its war against terror?

Disagree 80%
Agree 18%

The United States should partner with Pakistan in
conducting drone attacks against extremists.

Disagree 76%
Agree 21%

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the nation of India?

Favorable 41%
Unfavorable 54%

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the nation of
Afghanistan?

Favorable 45%
Unfavorable 48%

Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Afghan
President Hamid Karzai?

Favorable 21%
Unfavorable 69%

Do you think that the Karzai government in Afghanistan is
pro-Indian?

Pro-India 74%
Anti-India 15%

If you had a choice between a stable and prosperous Pakistan
that was ruled by a military dictatorship or a democratic
government that led to an unstable and insecure Pakistan,
which would you choose?

Democracy 75%
Dictatorship 23%

What is your main source of information?
TV 78%
Radio 9%
Newspaper 7%
Internet 3%

How credible are these information sources?
TV 80%
Radio 56%
Newspaper 55%
Internet 22%

So why is Pakistan's opinion of the U.S. so low? Maybe this has something to do with it.

Massive war games showcase deepening India-US ties


PM-Obama meet in mind, India and US move on n-fuel talks


India test-fires nuclear-capable missile

Lessons Learned?

Approach the problem set as AF/IN/PAK.

Bring in the Saudis and have them use TV in Pakistan to spread the message.

Listen to the advice of the Saudis.

Turki al Faisal former head of Saudi intelligence and ambassador to the U.S. had an op-ed in the Washington Post. Excerpt below.

As President Obama considers what to do about Afghanistan, it is important that he hear perspectives from all sides concerned about that critical region. In Riyadh, it is clear that the Taliban is weak in Afghanistan. Their record in government is well remembered by Afghans, including large numbers of Pashtuns, all of whom suffered greatly at the hands of Mohammad Omar's Taliban cohorts.

The Taliban is not a cohesive or uniform political party with a chain of command and a political manifesto. Rather, any disaffected, rebellious or aggrieved Afghan who overtly opposes the government by military means and otherwise has come to be identified as a member of the Taliban.

Osama bin Laden has become not only the symbol of opposition to world order in general and to the United States in particular, but he is looked upon by disaffected youths -- and not just Muslims -- as an indomitable, untouchable Robin Hood. Even if he no longer organizes and executes terrorist acts, the fact that he survives reinforces that appeal every day and adds to his charisma. Bringing him to account is a necessity, whether by capture or by death.

COIN Lessons via 80s Pop Culture

If the Sopranos was the must-see predeployment DVD, then here are two for AF/PAK. Add "The Beast of War" and "Rambo III" to your list.

One of the big things I advocate is cultural understanding over strategy. Once an individual has an understanding of the culture, the strategy starts to write itself. So here are a couple of cultural lessons taken from the two movies listed above.

Pashtunwali - See a full breakdown here




Buzkashi - The Afghan national sport. So much for handing out soccer balls. How good are you at handling a headless sheep?

Rambo Plays Buzkashi with the Locals

So There's Only Two Options?

CT or what the U.S. calls COIN; apparently these are the only two options on the table.

Here is the latest op-ed co-authored by one of my favorites, Dr. John Nagl, calling for a COIN strategy in Afghanistan even though General McChrystal has one underway. The article argues COIN as the superior strategy over CT operations.

Favorite quote:

To understand why, consider the analogous case of Iraq over the last three years. In January 2007, the "surge" of combat forces began as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized clearing areas of fighters, holding that territory and building the infrastructure and institutions that had been so badly lacking -- just as Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has proposed for Afghanistan.

At the time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's Shiite-led government was widely viewed as weak and sectarian. An overwhelming number of Sunni Arabs -- who formed the center of gravity of the insurgency -- rejected its legitimacy and had boycotted the December 2005 elections that brought it to power. The Maliki government had done little to allay these feelings; on the contrary, elements of its security forces participated in sectarian violence against Sunnis through 2006. As Sunnis became further alienated from the central government, the cycle of violence began to spiral out of control.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy aimed to arrest this process by using American troops to protect the population -- predicting, correctly, that until basic security was restored in key neighborhoods and communities, extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide would continue to inflame the situation. With U.S. forces clearing and holding territory and demonstrating to the Sunnis that they had a reasonable alternative to Al Qaeda and its sectarian warfare, the extremists were sidelined. Security began to improve, and the political space necessary for reconciliation began to open.

While it does make an argument for COIN over CT operations, it is counter intuitive to an article co-authored by Nagl earlier this year.

If it is true that a new plan is needed in Afghanistan, it is doubly true that Afghanistan is not Iraq. Conflating the two conflicts would be a dangerous oversimplification. The Iraq war has been mostly urban, largely sectarian, and contained within Iraq’s borders. The Afghan war has been intrinsically rural, mostly confined to the Pashtun belt across the country’s south and east, and inextricably linked to Pakistan. Because the natures of the conflicts are different, the strategies to fight them must be equally so. The very fact that Pakistan serves as a sanctuary for the Taliban and al Qaeda makes regional diplomacy far more necessary than it was in Iraq. Additional troops are certainly needed in Afghanistan, but a surge itself will not equal success.

I am not trying to play "stump the chump" here, but rather pointing out that the Af/Pak strategy debate has now devolved into dangerous oversimplification.